OPINIÃO. Cidadão ou espectador? A parte que nos toca nesta crise institucional

Brazil's democracy isn't defined by the absence of crises; it hinges on institutions capable of resolving them. Since the 1988 Constitution, the nation has faced severe political and ethical crises. In most cases, however, one or more institutions maintained enough authority and legitimacy to respond to excesses and mitigate some of the resulting imbalances.

In 1992, this was tested for the first time. The newly elected president faced corruption allegations, prompting Congress to investigate, the public to protest, and the Chamber to authorize impeachment. Fernando Collor de Mello stepped down before the outcome, but the Senate continued the trial within constitutional guidelines, ultimately declaring him unfit for public office for eight years.

The system worked. Nearly a decade later, the Mensalão scandal involved both executive and legislative figures. The Supreme Court conducted a lengthy trial with ample opportunity for defense, resulting in the conviction of central political power figures. Once again, an institution rose to the occasion. The Lava Jato, initiated in 2014, presented a different situation.

It may have represented one of the greatest opportunities since democratization to tackle corruption in the relationships between the state, businesses, and political parties. Confessions, cooperation, leniency agreements, billions in recovered funds, and extensive evidence revealed mechanisms of kickbacks and misuse of public resources, effectively giving rise to the perception that entrepreneurs, high officials, and political leaders could be held accountable before justice.

In 2016, the country faced a second presidential impeachment. The Chamber authorized the process, and the Senate conducted the trial, deciding the removal of the mandate by a 61 to 20 vote. Regardless of differing interpretations of its merits, the constitutional rite and impeachment legislation were observed. Once more, institutions functioned.

However, Lava Jato committed errors and abuses. Subsequent decisions acknowledged issues of competence, bias, and the admissibility of certain evidence. These excesses needed to be addressed: due process should apply to all. The path should have been to preserve what the operation revealed and correct only its excesses. Contaminated evidence should have been discarded, and irregular processes, annulled.

Whenever legally possible, investigations should have been retried, and new trials held, all with due legal guarantees. Brazil should not have had to choose between Lava Jato and the Rule of Law. Ultimately, for a significant portion of society, it felt as though both were lost. The opportunity to cleanse and strengthen our institutions was squandered, and even more valuable: the confidence in them.

However, it must be acknowledged that society was not merely a victim of this process. Institutions are made of people and reflect, to a large extent, what we tolerate, demand, or fail to demand. Indifference, scant vigilance, and selective indignation in the face of misconduct also weighed heavily on the outcome. Perceptions remained divided: one section of society believed the system protected the powerful, while another felt the investigative and justice institutions had been politicized.

What could have bolstered institutions ended up contributing to their weakening. The image of the independence of the bodies responsible for investigating, supervising, and promoting accountability among the highest state agents also suffered wear and tear. Looking back, the journey is revealing. In 1992, other institutions responded to the executive crisis.

In the Mensalão scandal, the judiciary assumed a central role. In 2016, impeachment followed the prescribed institutional path. In Lava Jato, the investigative and justice system faced corruption but ultimately found itself subjected to political scrutiny. This trajectory was far from linear. There were advances and moments of institutional strengthening, yet the wear and tear is already evident – just as much from the institutions that people relied on when others failed.

Since then, executive, legislative, and judicial branches have increasingly frequently entered into conflict over the limits of their respective powers. The executive challenged the judiciary. The judiciary gained increasing prominence in matters of significant political impact. The legislative expanded its influence over key budget items and reacted to judicial decisions.

The boundary between the powers itself became the main battlefield of Brazilian politics. Even the January 2023 attacks did not interrupt this dynamic. The three branches reacted together to the invasion of their premises, but the conduct of investigations and trials soon became another focus of political-ideological dispute. The crisis we now face has advanced one step further.

It no longer affects just one or another institution; it has reached virtually all mechanisms meant to contain it. The executive and legislative branches confront their own questions. The judiciary, which should deliver the final word in constitutional conflicts, has entered the center of political battles and become a target of growing criticism.

Doubts about the independence of supervisory and accountability mechanisms remain. Who will be relied upon when a crisis simultaneously affects those who govern, those who legislate, and those whose function is to judge impartially? This does not mean that there are no honest people in all institutions. The problem is that an institution may legally have the power to decide, yet lack the necessary confidence to do so.