Arranca el curso político más tenso y crucial, con vientos de fin de ciclo

A tense and crucial political course has begun, with the winds of end-of-cycle blowing. After eight consecutive years in power, governments typically experience significant political and social wear. However, the impact is much greater when the executive, established in parliamentary weakness since its inception, views staying in power as an end in itself through continuous and increasingly large concessions to independence and minority allies, a strategy of polarization and fracture with the opposition, which is almost denied the right to alternation; or in a slow but inexorable process of institutional decay, which reached a special and worrying significance with the controversial statement of Pedro Sánchez about governing with or without the legislative power, i.e., behind the Congress.

When added to the multiple crises of both external and internal origin that Spain has suffered in recent years (COVID-19, war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East...), and the outbreaks in the last months (devastating summer fires, an unprecedented crisis in Ceuta...), whose management has deepened the erosion of political and social rifts, or the barrage of scandals and corruption surrounding Sánchez personally and institutionally, the result is a powder keg.

Alternatively, the most tense, sharp, and uncertain beginning of a new political and economic course. A crucial period for the future of Spain, considering that in May 2027 municipal and autonomous elections will be held and, before the end of August, barring any delay, general elections that Sánchez has managed to postpone despite his parliamentary minority or the continuous lack of budgets.

Ceuta, more than a migration crisis: the massive and illegal influx of around 80,000 people from Morocco, with the tacit approval of its authorities, is much more than that, an invasion that violates Spain's territorial integrity, as President Pedro Sánchez himself acknowledged (though he blamed the mafias), to which no coherent strategy followed, but rather the clamorous absence of the head of the government, who was criticized for not interrupting his vacation in La Mareta (Lanzarote) and replaced by a parade of several of his ministers in the autonomous city without offering an effective response to the crisis.

Almost a month later, 8,000 illegal migrants remain in Ceuta (about 6,000 adults and around 2,000 minors), causing serious social tension, health overloads, and growing fear of a public health crisis. Meanwhile, against strong EU pressure to prevent any of these irregular migrants from crossing to the peninsula, the Spanish government is already working on relocating several hundred minors to be hosted by autonomous communities, and is facing harsh criticism from Europe for its massive regularization policy.

While the Spanish executive responds with surprising calmness to what many see as provocations from the Kingdom of Alau, which it continues to defend as a reliable partner. The new course will begin with this crisis in full fervor and in a context where it is not only the opposition that has denounced the government's passivity or even abandonment of Ceuta, but also growing clamor from within the socialist ranks.

It was only on Tuesday, August 25, almost a month after the crisis erupted, that Sánchez ended his summer break, convening the National Security Council to address the dramatic situation of the autonomous city and decreeing sole command, something Ceuta had been requesting for weeks. It was not until Thursday, August 3, that he appeared in Congress to explain, though the opposition and some of his allies considered it too late, forcing his advance appearance.

Meanwhile, several of his ministers, who gave a poor performance in the Senate, minimizing their representative and institutional work, appeared before Congress the previous week, highlighting the deep division within the executive. Indeed, Interior Minister Margarita Robles pointed out the warning signal about the imminent threat to Ceuta, which Marlaska denied.

This is undoubtedly the biggest hot potato the executive faces in its troubled return. But it is not the only one. The carbonized Spain drama: despite previous traumatic experiences, the ruling class continues to stumble over the same stone: the lack of prevention and coordination between administrations, between the State and territories, to prevent the carbon fires from burning half of Spain every summer, in a trend that is becoming more devastating.

From January to August 19, nearly 300,000 hectares burned in Spain, more than 48% of the area burned in the entire EU (which together totaled 616,000 hectares up to that point), making it the second most affected country in the bloc that summer, only behind Italy. Despite this, firefighting efforts were constantly accompanied and exacerbated by use as political ammunition, with constant criticisms, jabs, and accusations between the central administration and the autonomous governments.