Malay-Muslim unity is the bogeyman: How a Hadi-led PAS could swallow BN and PN whole — Phar Kim Beng

The phrase "Malay-Muslim unity" may initially appear comforting, as it suggests solidarity, safeguarding the community, and political unity among Malay and Muslim majority. However, a deeper examination reveals a critical question: unity under whose leadership, guided by whose ideology, and ultimately for whose political gain? This is where a Hadi-led PAS poses a strategic challenge to both Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN).

Malay-Muslim unity can quickly become a political bogeyman, perpetuating the notion that Malays are divided, Islam is under threat, and political consolidation is essential. Once this notion is accepted, any disagreement among Malay parties can be portrayed as dangerous fragmentation. The ultimate destination is not necessarily Malay unity; it could instead be PAS dominance.

Under Abdul Hadi Awang, PAS has consistently shown its ability to collaborate with political organizations whose ideologies are vastly different. It has worked with PKR and DAP through Pakatan Rakyat, embraced UMNO through Muafakat Nasional, and became a crucial part of PN alongside Bersatu. This situation has evolved over time, and BN must carefully consider the current political dynamics.

BN might believe that cooperation with PN can prevent a three-way contest and consolidate Malay votes. This proposition is appealing in terms of electoral outcomes. If Malay votes are divided between UMNO, Bersatu, and PAS, while PH maintains a relatively united support elsewhere, cooperation seems to make sense. However, electoral arithmetic does not equate to political strategy.

Every time BN becomes more reliant on PAS voters, campaign efforts and ideological narratives, PAS can gain more bargaining power over BN. The danger is not what most people initially perceive—it's the opposite direction. BN may believe they are gaining PAS’s strength, but PAS could ultimately absorb BN's political influence. The same dilemma applies to PN.

Originally, Bersatu was intended to give PN a broad Malay-nationalist leadership structure, while PAS provided its extensive grassroots organization. However, organizational longevity is crucial. Under Abdul Hadi Awang, PAS has repeatedly proven its exceptional capacity to work with political organizations that have differing ideologies.

This experience, combined with PAS's vast network of religious organizations, activists, institutions, and deeply ingrained constituencies, particularly in the northern and eastern parts of Malaysia, makes it a formidable force. If Bersatu weakens while PAS remains strong, PN might increasingly transform into PAS in disguise. The debate over whether Bersatu remains within PN highlights the importance of clear institutional structures.

When different senior PN leaders offer conflicting interpretations of Bersatu's status, the fundamental question emerges: who ultimately determines the direction of PN? If PAS ultimately answers that question, PN could shift from being an alliance that PAS participates in to becoming a vehicle for PAS to expand its influence. BN faces an ironic historical parallel.

In the past, UMNO saw PAS as its main competitor for Malay-Muslim political leadership. This rivalry extended across generations and involved more than just competing for constituencies; it was about defining the authority to govern Malay politics and the relationship between Islam, government, and the Malaysian nation. Malay-Muslim unity can blur these distinctions.

When every electoral contest is framed as Malay parties uniting against a perceived political threat, UMNO loses one of its strongest historical arguments for existing separately from PAS. Why should Malay voters choose UMNO if PAS appears to represent Malay interests more uncompromisingly and Islamic politics more authentically?

That is the trap. PAS does not necessarily have to dismantle BN. It only needs to make BN increasingly dependent on an electoral system controlled by PAS ideologically. Nor does PAS have to formally absorb Bersatu; it just needs to become indispensable to PN. This creates what can be termed the "anaconda strategy" in Malaysian coalition politics.

The prey does not need to be consumed immediately. It can first be surrounded, constrained, and gradually deprived of its independent political space. Malay-Muslim unity serves this purpose well because it is almost impossible to satisfy permanently. There will always be another alleged threat requiring greater unity, another election with fewer contested contests, another disagreement that supposedly weakens the Malays, or another controversy that can be used to argue for stronger political consolidation for Islam.

Consequently, the goal continues to shift. Initially, there is cooperation, then electoral coordination, followed by seat negotiations, common narratives, ideological convergence, and eventually, BN and PN may question their political identities independent of PAS. This is why BN should exercise extreme caution when interpreting short-term electoral cooperation as long-term strategic compatibility.

UMNO historically represented a broad Malay nationalist tradition operating within Malaysia's multiracial constitution. MCA and MIC continue to be part of BN due to BN's role as a coalition capable of navigating differences among communities. PAS, on the other hand, originates from a different political lineage. There is nothing inherently wrong with PAS seeking greater political power democratically.

If Malay voters elect PAS, their democratic choice should be respected. The issue arises when the language of communal survival is used to imply that political consolidation is inevitable. Malay-Muslim voters are not a monolithic political entity. They have diverse perspectives.