The Expedia breach shows why companies must stop holding data they do not need
Collect less, retain less.
Expedia Group disclosed on November 12 that hackers infiltrated its systems through a third-party data platform provider. Extortionists claim possession of hundreds of millions of traveler records, yet the stolen data's volume and contents have not been verified. The ongoing investigation highlights a broader issue: businesses and their partners often accumulate more personal information than necessary to complete their tasks.
As a reporter with a commercial interest in the matter, I want to clarify that my company, Trua, offers a solution: identity verification without mandating organizations to retain the associated documents. However, I have also observed firsthand how credentialing systems operate by separating assurance requirements from sensitive records.
Before founding Trua, I contributed to technology that became part of TSA PreCheck and other credential programs. Our focus was not on the quantity of information we could gather but rather on what a checkpoint truly needed to know. The enrollment process involved verifying government identification and biographical details, conducting checks against criminal and terrorism databases, and issuing a Known Traveler Number upon clearance.
During screening, the critical question was whether the traveler was approved. This approach required a trustworthy determination without necessitating access to the full background file, Social Security number, or other enrollment records. These records remained with the vetting authority. This distinction proved crucial, as we managed to maintain verification integrity while avoiding unnecessary data transfer.
Most private sector entities, however, operate differently. They collect identity documents, payment information, travel histories, and other personal data for specific transactions, retaining them long after the fact. Copies proliferate across interconnected vendor environments, often with persistent access. When a trusted supplier is compromised, the breach's impact extends beyond the supplier itself, as evidenced by the Expedia incident.
The breach typically becomes apparent only during audits. A midsize staffing firm discovered roughly 180,000 applicant and worker records in its systems, with 35% exceeding six years and more than half pertaining to individuals who had either never been hired or had departed years earlier. Files containing Social Security numbers and background reports had been duplicated to at least four vendors and two client HR systems.
No single action caused this liability; it accumulated over time through each onboarding form, integration, and decision to retain data "just in case." The underlying issue is that most organizations do not require these permanent copies to make their decisions. A travel platform may need to verify a customer's identity and payment validity, while an employer may require proof of an applicant's credentials or screening criteria.
These questions can be answered with reliable, purpose-specific confirmations. Retaining every source document does not enhance the quality of the answer. While the incentives for overcollection may seem justified, they are becoming increasingly costly. Companies desire speed and certainty, and technology vendors frequently design services around raw data access.
Risk assessments often treat extensive personal information stores as an unavoidable aspect of business operations rather than a choice to be reconsidered. As AI agents start acting on individuals' behalf, organizations must establish who authorized a transaction and the agent's permitted actions. Without a more effective model, this need could be exploited as an excuse to create additional identity databases.
There is an alternative. Individuals undergo strong verification and then share only the attributes or status necessary for a specific purpose. The receiving organization receives a trustworthy, limited response, potentially subject to expiration or revalidation, instead of a full dossier that must be protected indefinitely. Mobile driver’s license systems and other attribute-verification systems demonstrate how this can be achieved.
While it does not eradicate cybersecurity risks, it reduces the quantity of sensitive information distributed across corporate and vendor systems. The benefits are practical. Organizations that collect and retain less sensitive data minimize the information an attacker can obtain, limit third-party exposure, and simplify privacy obligations.
Insurers can assess unnecessary retention as a controllable risk, and individuals face fewer consequences from breaches at companies with which they have only a fleeting relationship. The exact extent of the Expedia intrusion remains to be determined. Nevertheless, the broader lesson is clear: as long as every business transaction generates another perpetual store of personal records, a breach at one trusted provider can pose risks to multiple organizations and the individuals who depend on them.
The sustainable solution is not simply to defend ever-expanding databases. Instead, businesses should collect less, retain less, and share only what a particular decision demands. Insurers should factor this liability into their assessments, and policymakers should prioritize data minimization alongside breach response. Otherwise, we will continue to read similar headlines.
Written by urgent.news from Fortune's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.