Scrap nukes before our luck runs out
In October 1986, at a two-day summit in the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev nearly struck an agreement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The recent film “The Brink of War” revisits that extraordinary moment, showing two adversaries who recognized that nuclear war is unwinnable and that deterrence — relying on the threat of…
In October 1986, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, for a crucial summit that nearly resulted in an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons. The historical film "The Brink of War" captures this moment, portraying two adversaries who understood that nuclear war was futile and that deterrence – relying on the threat of nuclear retaliation – was a perilous risk for humanity’s future.
Today, that gamble is more perilous than ever before, yet Congress has failed to conduct a thorough examination. For eight decades, nuclear deterrence has been the cornerstone of U.S. security policy, often portrayed as sober, realistic, and time-tested. However, experts now contend that deterrence is not a natural law but rather a theory relying on assumptions about human behavior, technology, and geopolitics that no longer align with our current world.
While the post-Cold War era is often viewed as a period of stability, characterized by unusually strong buffers masking an inherently fragile deterrence system, this stability was, in fact, an anomaly. This has led to multiple near-misses, illustrating the precarious nature of our current security paradigm.
Written by urgent.news from The Korea Times's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.