Africa: Africa Needs More Than Envoys to Secure the Red Sea

Africa's Horn faces a complex web of conflicts that are drawing in international powers. The spread of envoys and diplomatic efforts has not steered the region toward stability. In September, Ansarullah, a Yemeni insurgent group, seized control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, linking the Horn to broader Middle Eastern conflicts. This confrontation has galvanized Middle Eastern nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, to bolster political structures and fortify military ties.

These shifts are far removed from the historical diplomatic strategies employed by African entities.

The Red Sea's instability is now exacerbated by multiple crises, including Ansarullah's involvement in the Israel-Hamas conflict, tensions with Iran, and simmering disputes in the Horn. Iran's strategy of maintaining influence across the region has further complicated matters. The group's ties with al-Shabaab have turned Ansarullah into a formidable force destabilizing a critical maritime route, which is vital to nearly 15% of global trade.

The Horn of Africa's four major conflict zones are now interlinked with Middle Eastern issues. While local grievances fuel these conflicts, external actors, primarily from the Middle East, are steering regional dynamics. Notably, the UAE's extensive involvement across Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan highlights a pattern of deep-seated, multi-faceted engagements.

In response to this evolving landscape, African countries have scaled up their diplomatic presence through the creation of numerous envoys. However, this strategy has not yielded significant results. Instead, external partners, including international organizations like the UN and EU, are the primary drivers behind conflict resolution initiatives. This envoy-focused approach has limited the effectiveness of African interventions.

In contrast, Middle Eastern countries have adopted more cohesive political-military frameworks to address shared challenges. The establishment of the Maritime Defense Coalition (MMDC) and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) exemplify this trend. These frameworks, however, exclude key African nations such as landlocked Ethiopia and the UAE, which may undermine their effectiveness. Moreover, Eritrea's withdrawal from the IGAD further complicates regional coordination efforts.

As the Horn grapples with these intertwined crises, the reliance on envoys and diplomatic shuffling appears insufficient. The region's military institutions, once thought capable of securing the Red Sea, are underutilized. The complex interplay of local grievances, external influence, and political maneuvering underscores the need for a more integrated and localized approach to conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa.