Urgent.News

What's breaking now, across thousands of outlets.

Tech

Hardening an AWS EKS cluster: IRSA, NetworkPolicies, restricted Pod Security and Secrets Manager via CSI

A freshly created EKS cluster works, but it's permissive. Every pod can reach every other pod, workloads can run as root, and the easy way to give an application AWS access is to attach permissions to the node role, which hands them to every pod on that node. This post works through four controls that close those gaps, using a single example workload: an orders-api deployment in the orders…

A freshly created EKS cluster is permissive by default. Every pod can reach every other pod, workloads can run as root, and giving an application AWS access is as simple as attaching permissions to the node role. This post outlines four controls to mitigate these risks using an orders-api deployment as an example.

First, implement IAM Roles for Service Accounts (IRSA). This lets a Kubernetes service account assume an IAM role, receiving a projected, short-lived token that the AWS SDK exchanges for temporary credentials. No access keys are required, and permissions are not granted on the node. Register the cluster's OIDC issuer with IAM and create a least-privilege policy for reading a specific secret from AWS Secrets Manager. Then create the role and service account together, associating the policy with the role.

Next, implement NetworkPolicies to enforce default-deny traffic within the orders namespace. Allow necessary traffic, such as DNS requests to the kube-dns service, and open specific paths for the orders-api to communicate with the database.

Third, enable Pod Security Admission with restricted settings to block privileged and root containers at admission time.

Lastly, use the Secrets Store CSI driver to mount AWS Secrets Manager secrets as files, eliminating the need to manually copy secrets into Kubernetes Secrets. This approach restricts the attack surface and enhances security within the EKS cluster.

Written by urgent.news from Dev.to's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.

Read the original at dev.to →

More in Tech

PO Matching Looked Like It Halved Unsafe Invoice Approvals Until I Checked Why

A LangGraph agent for Japanese invoices, killed with SIGKILL, pre-registered, and gated in CI. The headline gain from its last check turned out to be mostly routing, not detection.

  • PO matching reduced unsafe invoice approvals from 17.0% to 2.0%
  • Verification caught most errors, PO matching stopped one out of six wrong PO agreements
  • LangGraph agent had three versions, final one added duplicate checks and PO matching

WordPress Gets Scanned Every Hour. Core Does Nothing About It.

WordPress runs a huge share of the web, and that popularity cuts both ways: it also makes WordPress the single most-scanned CMS on the internet. Every hour, bots are quietly probing for wp-config.php.bak , hammering xmlrpc.php , trying default admin paths, and stuffing SQL injection attempts into every form field they can find.

  • WordPress scanned hourly for vulnerabilities
  • xZeroProtect plugin blocks malicious requests
  • Distinguishes bots from human traffic

More from Friday 16 October →