Saudi Arabia keeps nuclear weapons option open, report says

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman possesses weapons and ample wealth to acquire more, yet the conflict with the Houthis is revealing the challenges of procuring something else: a nation prepared to employ force to safeguard him against Iran and its allies. On the first day of the month, bin Salman contacted US President Donald Trump twice, urging him to strike the Houthis.

Trump declined, offering instead intelligence assistance and targeting information. Later, targets were chosen, bombs loaded onto American aircraft, and a strike in Yemen seemed imminent. However, Trump abruptly halted the operation.

The Saudis subsequently resumed bombing Yemen, but the situation did not improve. Britain provided a refueling aircraft to temporarily bolster the Saudi Air Force's defensive efforts. Turkey and Pakistan, under Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Shehbaz Sharif respectively, expressed support for Riyadh. Ankara announced readiness to assist with technical military requirements under a defense agreement signed between the countries.

Despite having numerous friends willing to stand by them, Riyadh has a limited number of allies prepared to enter a war themselves. In 2018, bin Salman reportedly found a formula to address this issue. After years of tension with Iran, Saudi Arabia reached a reconciliation agreement with Tehran, mediated by China. The reasoning was straightforward: without assurance of American support during crises, Riyadh sought to diminish the frequency of conflicts it might encounter.

Simultaneously, the kingdom strengthened its ties with China, Russia, Turkey, and Pakistan. On August 7, a joint defense agreement was signed in Mecca by Ankara and Islamabad, declaring that an armed attack on any one of the three nations would be considered an attack on all three. America remained the primary security pillar, with Saudi Arabia continuing to purchase weapons from Washington and rely on it, while simultaneously acquiring additional insurance policies.

However, the true test is coming. The question is the value of these policies when missiles begin falling: weapons, intelligence, air defense, troops, or a display of support. In peacetime, it is easier to overlook these distinctions. In war, they become apparent quickly. The Houthis are targeting Saudi Arabia's economic foundations.

The reconciliation with Tehran did not halt Houthi aggression, and the Mecca defense pact has not yet drawn Turkey and Pakistan into the war. Riyadh is not necessarily anticipating a Turkish division to advance toward Sanaa. Rather, the immediate concern is air defense: Saudi Arabia seeks interceptors and assistance against Houthi missiles and drones from its allies, as prolonged fighting in the region has depleted American supplies.

The practical worth of its new alliances will be determined by this support. For bin Salman, the insult is less concerning than the bill presented by the crisis to the kingdom. The Houthis threaten two of the foundations bin Salman has built his new Saudi Arabia upon: security and business. The war reignites the old security risk precisely as the crown prince attempts to convince the world that the new Saudi Arabia is a stable, long-term investment destination.

Ultimately, he needs investors, tourists, and international executives to continue viewing the kingdom as secure enough to invest in. Vision 2030, encompassing futuristic cities, tourism, foreign investment, business centers, and ports, is based on the premise that the kingdom can transition from a crisis-driven state to a predictable, capital-friendly environment.

Missile strikes over Riyadh and warfare in Bab al-Mandab are an unfavorable advertisement for this vision. Additionally, oil has once again reminded the world of its financial obligations. For decades, Saudi Arabia invested in the East-West Pipeline, a 1,200-kilometer route designed to enable the kingdom to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and transport oil from the Gulf to Yanbu on the Red Sea.

As Riyadh relied more on this pipeline, its importance increased, and its vulnerability became more apparent. In June, 92% of Saudi crude oil exports by sea passed through the Yanbu terminal, and the East-West Pipeline carried four to five million barrels per day. Until September 11, when drones from Iraq struck three pumping stations, temporarily halting oil flows through the pipeline, the western route's significance grew.

The Houthis are also impacting the western export route, announcing a naval boycott against Saudi shipping in July and warning that their attacks had shifted from threats to active assaults against vessels linked to Saudi interests. Riyadh was forced to reroute oil exports destined for Asia through the Suez Canal, significantly increasing the journey compared to passage through Bab al-Mandab.

Shipowners, insurers, and trading companies do not need a sinking vessel to alter course. The mere possibility of Houthi targeting causes economic damage, leading to higher insurance costs, longer voyages, and diminishing the benefits of the shorter Red Sea route.