The Yom Kippur War: How Israel missed the warning signs before the surprise attack - opinion
Israel’s greatest failure in the Yom Kippur War was self-inflicted, as intelligence chief Eli Zeira’s confidence in his own assessment led Israel to dismiss mounting warnings of an Arab attack.
Israel's army was caught off guard by Egypt and Syria's surprise attack on Yom Kippur in 1973. The chief of staff, David Elazar, expressed his uncertainty to the cabinet, admitting that it was their first defensive war. Despite this, Elazar believed they could win the war, stating, "We cannot win this war" just five days later. The Arab armies that attacked in 1973 were vastly different from the ones defeated six years prior in the Six-Day War.
They had been retrained by Soviet military advisers and armed with modern weapons, including the Sagger anti-tank missile and SAM antiaircraft missile, posing a significant challenge for Israel's tank corps and air superiority. The Arabs also had a formidable leader in Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Major failure was the result of one man, Maj.-Gen.
Eli Zeira, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, who had underestimated the threat and allowed himself to believe that Sadat did not want war due to its consequences. This self-confidence led the army to dismiss warnings and continue their operations, despite the unprecedented deployment of Arab forces. Intelligence reports and foreign sources had warned of the impending war, but Zeira insisted that the danger was low.
In the end, it was Zeira's refusal to activate a device he had developed that could tap into Egyptian communications that prevented the army from gaining crucial insights into their enemy's intentions.
Written by urgent.news from Jerusalem Post's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
