Nigeria: Finding a Path to Peace - Nigeria's Long, Faltering History of Dialogue With Boko Haram

Maiduguri, Nigeria — Reaching a state of peace with Boko Haram may be achievable, but it demands trust and genuine sincerity. Mamman Nur, a senior cleric of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), had previously attempted to evade capture twice before, knowing that his third escape attempt would likely result in his death.

A prominent figure in Nigeria's insurgent jihadist movement for over two decades, Nur was a close aide to the late Boko Haram founder, Mohammed Yusuf, and the ISWAP leader. However, he was now caught in a dilemma. Accused of secret contact with the Nigerian government through the "Swiss process," a dialogue initiative, Nur was detained by ISWAP's Shura council.

This council viewed his actions as treason, leading to his sentencing to death and public execution by ISWAP's secret police in September 2018. This incident highlighted the central obstacle in any diplomatic effort with Nigeria's jihadists: can a movement like Boko Haram, which considers dialogue as treachery, ever be persuaded to seek peace?

Nearly eight years later, reports indicate a ceasefire between the government and Boko Haram, suggesting that, albeit tentatively, a path to peace might be changing. Over 17 years of war and nearly 350,000 indirect civilian deaths, the conflict in Nigeria's northeast has reached a stalemate. However, behind the scenes, the Nigerian government has been quietly attempting to find a negotiated resolution to the jihadist insurgency.

The idea of negotiations with Boko Haram and ISWAP divides Nigeria. The government firmly maintains that talks cannot be held with groups legally categorized as terrorist organizations, despite a three-month ceasefire with ISWAP holding. Both sides believe a settlement is possible, stating that a non-violent approach is intellectually acceptable.

While governments often treat jihadist groups as irredeemably violent, extremist groups are political actors that adapt to their environments. Despite red lines on political demands, these groups can change over time. In Egypt, Gama'a al-Islamiya renounced violence and stood in elections in 2011, while in Syria, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham transformed into a dominant force behind a transitional government.

However, the decentralized nature of jihadist groups, legal prohibitions, histories of distrust, and building domestic political consensus pose significant challenges to the timing and incentives for peace talks. Negotiations require patience, political will, and strong intelligence networks. The Nigerian government has struggled in all these areas.

Previous governments have avoided addressing the grievances fueling the northeastern conflict or properly understanding their opponents. The traditional approach has been to "settle" troublemakers by buying them off with money and positions. However, JAS and ISWAP are different: they are ideological foes seeking no financial reward or patronage.

Peace is possible, but it requires trust and sincerity, according to a former ISWAP commander who surrendered to authorities. The difficulty lies in the fact that up until now, no one has sat down with JAS/ISWAP to truly understand them.