Two countries and a shared river: Mistrust is not inevitable

India’s crucial rivers begin in a region concealed from Indian view, under the jurisdiction of China. The Brahmaputra originates as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, flowing into Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang; the Sutlej and Indus also emerge there. India’s knowledge of these rivers is derived from China’s discretion to share. The two nations have no formal water agreement – only two flood-season memorandums, one for the Brahmaputra (2002) and another for the Sutlej (2005).

India pays a substantial fee for this information, along with a consultative body that convenes only under favourable relations. The arrangement is intentionally weak, as China provides data under its own conditions and interpretations of sovereignty. Notably, neither India nor China participate in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, which would require upstream nations to notify downstream states and refrain from causing harm.

This convention was initially opposed by China, while India abstained. The memorandum system can be suspended without violating agreements. In 2017, during the Doklam standoff, China halted sharing Brahmaputra data, citing damaged equipment, yet resumed once tensions eased, only to cease again after the 2020 Galwan clash. Consequently, the memorandum expired in June 2025.

Flood prediction data is not merely a public asset; it serves as a tool – released during amicable relations and withheld during strife. Beijing attributes these interruptions to technical failures, asserts the dam's full sovereignty within China, and pledges to prevent and mitigate disasters. While some of these assertions may hold truth, a Chinese scholar observed during a state-sponsored Tibet visit that the river "flows into India, and we can stop it anytime we want."

This reassurance, however, remains unverifiable due to the region's restricted access. The Medog project, China's largest hydropower initiative at 60 GW, is being constructed at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo. Situated in one of the world's most seismically active regions, this project raises concerns about its potential impact during floods.

Arunachal Pradesh’s chief minister deems it an "existential threat" to the Siang valley. Meanwhile, Bangladesh, at the river's terminus, requested information in early 2026 but received none. The plateau remains opaque due to China's governance of Tibet as a colonized entity, dominated to an extreme degree. India, home to the Dalai Lama and the largest Tibetan diaspora, is viewed with particular suspicion.

However, this narrative is not solely about Chinese opacity versus Indian virtue. India has also been complicit in its own vulnerability; successive governments have relied on the paid-data memorandum and have not pursued a binding, basin-wide framework that would treat information as a right, not a concession. India's actions are not limited to victimhood; it is also a contributor to the problem, sharing limited information with Bangladesh and suspending the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack.

The situation on the Brahmaputra mirrors India's approach to the Indus. This predicament is not predetermined. The Senegal River exemplifies a cooperative model, where four of the world's poorest nations collectively own their dams as "common and indivisible property," maintaining this cooperation even amidst intermember conflict.

If states with limited resources and deep mistrust can pool sovereignty over a river, China's reluctance to do so is a deliberate choice, not an external constraint. This is evident in China's absence from the Mekong Commission, a regional body built by its neighbors. India's water future is intrinsically linked to a plateau it cannot see or influence, controlled by a skeptical neighbor across a volatile border.

The central question is not whether India can compel China to open up – a task beyond its reach – but whether India will establish the necessary institutions to treat flood information as a shared necessity rather than a bargaining tool. Ultimately, these nations must determine whether a shared river is a common lifeline or a weapon kept in reserve.