Why Montenegro matters more to Europe than its size suggests

Montenegro’s strategic importance to Europe transcends its modest size and economic impact, according to a report titled "Why Montenegro matters more to Europe than its size suggests." While Iceland’s recent EU referendum did not result in the country’s expulsion from Europe, Montenegro faces a different scenario. Iceland already belongs to the European Economic Area and the Schengen zone, and enjoys Single Market access, embodying a relationship on its own terms.

However, Montenegro, which has been negotiating full EU membership for 14 years, has opened and provisionally closed 18 of the 33 chapters required for membership.

Unlike Iceland, Montenegro wants to fully integrate into the EU and has not opted for an à la carte relationship. The report emphasizes that Montenegro’s strategic significance lies in its location within the Adriatic, its NATO membership, and its position in the Western Balkans where European, Russian, Chinese, and Turkish interests intersect.

Its political trajectory carries significant weight beyond its economic weight. While Montenegro has not yet completed all required reforms, areas such as the rule of law, judicial independence, corruption, public administration, and media freedom still need improvement.

The EU’s accession process is based on meeting specific conditions, and lowering these conditions would harm both Montenegro and the EU. Conditional progress is viable only if it results in a credible outcome; otherwise, reform loses its incentive. The report warns that political uncertainty can lead to economic uncertainty, discouraging investment and making anti-European actors' messages more effective.

For a small, tourism-dependent economy like Montenegro, political instability can quickly translate into business decisions and affect long-term capital.

However, EU membership would not eliminate these risks, nor can Brussels solve Montenegro’s internal political issues. A credible accession path would, however, make the consequences of reversing reforms clearer and provide investors, officials, and voters with a more reliable point of reference. The EU must strictly adhere to the reform requirements and clearly outline the benefits upon their fulfillment.

Access to EU programs and the single market should serve as preparation for membership, not as a comfortable holding pattern.

Ultimately, the EU should evaluate Montenegro based on both domestic reforms and the strategic cost of leaving the accession process unresolved. Confirming Montenegro’s accession would demonstrate that the process can still reach a conclusion, a practical outcome more valuable than reaffirming enlargement’s geopolitical priority.

While Iceland can choose its EU relationship independently due to its secure and prosperous position, Montenegro cannot be treated as a smaller version of the same model. Its strategic location makes prolonged ambiguity in its accession process costly. The upcoming enlargement will reflect more on the European Union than the size of the country joining it.

If Montenegro completes its reforms and the door remains closed, the message to the Western Balkans will be clear: the process offers integration but not necessarily membership, potentially benefiting those who prefer to keep the region unstable.