Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Steakhouse Financial

Flash Loan Attack Vector Analysis: Steakhouse Financial Target Protocol - Steakhouse Financial (TVL: $3.003.4M), a multi-chain yield optimization platform, is the focus of this analysis. The protocol's architecture includes a flash loan-enabled vault system, a price oracle aggregation layer, and a governance-controlled parameter-update module. This report specifically examines flash loan attack vectors, which involve borrowing uncollateralized capital for a single transaction to exploit protocol logic and extract value.

Key Findings:

1. Oracle price manipulation via flash loan-driven market swings (High, Medium-High): Attackers can manipulate prices using flash loans, potentially losing up to 15% of TVL in a single epoch.

2. Re‑entrancy through vault callbacks (Medium, Low-Medium): A flaw in the vault's deposit/withdraw callbacks allows recursive withdrawals, potentially losing up to 2% of TVL per block.

3. Governance parameter hijack using flash loan-funded voting power (Critical, Low): Attackers can gain voting power through flash loans, leading to unlimited potential loss and a full protocol drain.

4. Liquidation sandwich/front‑run (Medium, Medium): Attackers can manipulate liquidations by repaying user debts and then re‑liquidating positions at worse prices, netting a 0.5-2% TVL loss.

5. Flash loan-driven self‑destruct of auxiliary contracts (Low, Low): Attackers can destroy fee-collector contracts, causing negligible but potentially disruptive service issues.