What are the results of high-paying CEOs? In Korea, it is only considered over 3 years, but in the US and UK, it is considered over 5-10 years. 국내 상장사 10곳 중 7곳의 최고경영자(CEO) 성과가 3년 이상 장기적으로 평가되지 않는 것으로 나타났다. Of the listed companies in Korea, 7 out of 10 companies do not evaluate their CEOs' performances over a long-term period of 3 years or more. 21일 기업평가사이트 CEO스코어(대표 김승훈)가 국내 500대 상장사 CEO 496명의 성과 평가 기간을 조사한 결과, 3년 미만으로 평가하는 곳이 68.1%(338명)에 달했다. On the 21st, CEO Score, a corporate evaluation site, surveyed the performance evaluation periods of 496 CEOs of the top 500 listed companies in Korea and found that 68.1% (338 people) evaluate their performances in less than 3 years. 1년 만으로 평가하는 곳도 18.1%(90명)였다. 18.1% (90 people) of the companies evaluate their CEOs' performances in just one year. 3년은 49.6%(246명), 5년은 21.2%(105명), 10년은 9.7%(48명)였다. 49.6% (246 people) evaluate their performances over 3 years, 21.2% (105 people) over 5 years, and 9.7% (48 people) over 10 years. 미국과 영국 등 선진국은 5년에서 10년 단위로 CEO 성과를 평가하는 곳이 많다. In developed countries such as the US and UK, many evaluate their CEOs' performances over a period of 5 to 10 years. 2019년 5월 미국 경영자협회(ASA)가 발표한 ‘CEO 평가 가이드’에 따르면, 52%의 기업이 3년, 24%가 5년, 16%가 3년 이상으로 평가 기간을 설정하고 있다. According to the "CEO Evaluation Guide" published by the American Management Association (ASA) in May 2019, 52% of companies set their evaluation period at 3 years, 24% at 5 years, and 16% at more than 3 years. 영국은 상황이 더하다. The situation is even more extreme in the UK. 지난해 7월 영국 상장사 350곳의 의결권 자문사인 인스티튜셔널 쉐어홀더 서비스(ISS)가 조사한 결과, 10곳 중 8곳이 5년 이상의 장기 성과 측정 지표를 평가하고 있다. In July last year, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a voting rights advisory firm for 350 listed companies in the UK, found that 8 out of 10 companies evaluate long-term performance measurement indicators of more than 5 years. ISS는 보고서에서 “장기 성과 지표는 CEO가 단기 성과에만 집중하지 않고 지속가능경영을 추구하도록 돕는다”며 “장기 성과 지표는 주주총회에서 경영진의 성과 평가에 사용된다”고 설명했다. In the report, ISS stated that "Long-term performance indicators help CEOs focus on sustainable management rather than short-term performance, and are used to evaluate management performance at general meetings of shareholders." 한국 기업들도 이 같은 장기 성과 평가 제도를 도입해야 한다는 목소리가 높다. There is a high demand for Korean companies to adopt such a long-term performance evaluation system. 기업 지배구조 전문가인 정구현 서울대 경영학과 교수는 “한국은 주주가 단기간에 주식을 매도하는 비율이 높은 만큼, 경영진이 장기 성과에 집중할 수 있는 경영 환경을 만들어줘야 한다”고 말했다. Prof. Chung Koo-hyun, an expert on corporate governance and a professor at Seoul National University's business school, said, "In Korea, shareholders sell their stocks over a short period of time, so we need to create a management environment where management can focus on long-term performance." 그러면서 “이를 위해 이사회가 CEO 성과 평가에 적극적으로 나서야 한다”고 덧붙였다. He added, "To achieve this, the board of directors should take an active role in evaluating the CEO's performance."
While domestic listed companies have begun implementing "linkage disclosure of remuneration and performance" this year, international major countries still have a long way to go. Currently, Korea only presents the remuneration and performance indicators for the past three years, whereas the United States requires five years and the United Kingdom demands ten years.
To reduce the illusion created by remuneration fluctuations at the time of stock option exercises, the remuneration calculation methods are more detailed. For example, Microsoft's 2024 shareholder meeting statement showed the CEO's and key executives' remuneration, total shareholder return (TSR), and net profit for five years (2021-2025) in one table, alongside the TSR of the Nasdaq Computer Index, which is composed of major IT companies in the United States.
The UK pharmaceutical company, AstraZeneca, presents a ten-year range. Both companies display the trends of these indicators in graphs, allowing shareholders and stakeholders to compare them at a glance. While both companies follow the guidelines from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the UK's Companies' Registration Office, their disclosure systems are designed to show the rise and fall of management remuneration and the shareholders' returns from stock price fluctuations and dividends in a single timeline.
In contrast, Korea only presents the remuneration and operating income or total shareholder return of the CEO and general employees in a single table. Both countries must also disclose the gap between management and general employee remuneration. For instance, Apple's 2026 shareholder meeting statement showed that in the 2025 accounting year, Apple CEO Tim Cook's total compensation was $742.9 million (around 1028 billion Korean won), which is 533 times the median employee compensation ($139,483) and 533 times the median (176 times) and 118 times the top 25% of employee compensation.
This allows for a comparative analysis of the CEO's remuneration with that of general employees. To mitigate the illusion that management remuneration suddenly fluctuates due to stock option exercises, the system also provides a layered comparison of remuneration. Unlike Korea, the United States includes stock option profits in the remuneration for the year of exercise, spreading the cumulative stock option gains over several years.
For example, if a stock option's value was 100 at the end of the first year and increased to 120 due to a stock price rise, only the $20 increase would be reflected in the CEO's compensation for that year. However, this retrospective adjustment is not applied to Korea's remuneration-linked disclosure. The stock option exercise profits are reflected directly in the CEO's compensation for the year of exercise, leading to the illusion that the company awarded additional substantial compensation to the management for the year, even though the actual profits from the exercised options are incorporated into the compensation for that year.
Written by urgent.news from Hankyoreh's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
