Russians rush money abroad as sanctions tighten and capital flight accelerates

Russians are experiencing a surge in transferring funds abroad due to tightening sanctions and accelerating capital flight, according to Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service. During the period from December 2024 to June 2026, households sent almost 600 billion rubles to nonresident brokers, surpassing the total amount transferred in the preceding seven years.

In April through June alone, monthly transfers reached 42–45 billion rubles, which is more than $500 million. The intelligence service estimates that around 40% of these transfers actually left Russia. Of this figure, three-quarters were utilized in "parking strategies," where a brokerage account substitutes a foreign-currency bank account.

The remaining one-quarter was associated with preparations for a possible relocation. Sanctions and Western banks' stricter handling of Russian funds are primarily responsible for these outflows, especially following the European Union's blacklisting of Russia for inadequate money laundering prevention late last year. Concurrently, Russians have recommenced purchasing foreign currency in cash on a large scale.

In June, households' net foreign-currency purchases amounted to 54.9 billion rubles, followed by 52.2 billion rubles in May and 51.8 billion rubles in April. This represents a total of nearly 159 billion rubles over the three-month period, a record since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, approximately 2 trillion rubles moved from the banking system to cash from January to July, with 620 billion rubles transferred in July alone.

The intelligence service attributes the growing apprehension to the possibility of the Kremlin tightening domestic controls post the State Duma elections, possibly through martial law or another mobilization. Although banks are currently accessing foreign currency via third countries despite sanctions on direct shipments of dollars and euros, the U.S. Congress's potential passage of the "hellish sanctions" bill against Russia could cut off this channel.

These outflows coincide with a broader financial strain across Russia's economy. Earlier reports indicated that the federal budget might face a significant deficit due to lower-than-anticipated oil and gas revenues, a concern the Russian government has acknowledged. Ukraine’s intelligence service also reported that the financial situation of Russia's medium-sized and large businesses continued to worsen, exhibiting widening imbalances within the corporate sector.

Over half of Russia's large companies ended 2025 with declining profits and had scaled back or frozen investment projects, with many initiating preparations for layoffs. By February 24, 2026, approximately 300 companies were reportedly planning to close. For the first time, 74 Russian regions concurrently experienced severe financial distress, followed by a wave of widespread business closures across the country.

The Federal State Statistics Service reported that the federal budget shortfall was growing at an unprecedented rate. On April 3, 2026, 22 Russian industries were identified as deeply unprofitable, and by May, the Kremlin admitted that the decline in GDP had nearly tripled. In June, the Federal Tax Service instructed regional authorities to contemplate tax hikes to cover local budget deficits, which reached a record 1.5 trillion rubles in 2025.

Allegations surfaced in late July suggesting the Kremlin was secretly printing money to finance the war. On August 4, 2026, the Federal Tax Service confirmed that as many as 15,000 Russian companies were closing each month.