The Misperception of Available Tactical Nukes [ Hankyoreh Prism ]
"US' Plan for Extended Deterrence with Tactical Nuclear, Will President Lee Jae-myung Continue to Oppose it Even in the Face of North Korea's Nuclear Threat?"
This was the title of a commentary by Jo Yong-seok, spokesperson for the ruling People Power Party, on the 8th. The commentary mentioned that the US Department of Defense is increasing the importance of tactical nuclear weapons and recalled that President Lee Jae-myung had previously opposed the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.
It then argued that if even the US is reviewing new strategies to improve the effectiveness of its nuclear umbrella, then South Korea should also put all options on the table and review them calmly from the perspective of national interest.
The main point of this commentary is to consider redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.
However, US tactical nuclear weapons cannot be redeployed in South Korea simply because the Korean government wants them.
It is a matter of US global strategy.
In the past, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons was also made in accordance with changes in US global strategy.
On September 28, 1991, US President George H. W. Bush announced a "declaration to withdraw and dismantle tactical nuclear weapons deployed around the world" due to concerns that nuclear weapons scattered across 15 republics of the Soviet Union, which was on the brink of dissolution, could fall into the hands of "rogue states".
The US would withdraw its nuclear weapons deployed abroad to its mainland and demanded that the Soviet Union take the same action.
Tactical nuclear weapons deployed at US military bases in South Korea were also withdrawn at that time.
Recently, it was reported that Elbridge Colby, US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy, mentioned in a private speech that there is a growing interest in small tactical nuclear weapons and that the US needs to have a rational nuclear option.
Some people expect that if the US nuclear strategy changes, tactical nuclear weapons could be redeployed in South Korea, as mentioned in the commentary by spokesperson Jo Yong-seok on the 8th.
However, the possibility of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea is as slim as a camel passing through the eye of a needle, considering the US operational method of tactical nuclear weapons and strategic calculations.
In 1991, among the over 100 tactical nuclear weapons of the US military in Korea, 40 were artillery shells, so they were stationed with the US military artillery.
Currently, the US operates tactical nuclear weapons by dropping them from fighter jets.
The B61-12 tactical nuclear bombs deployed at US bases in Germany and other European countries are dropped by B-2 strategic bombers, F-35, and other air force aircraft.
These bombs have a range of destructive power from 0.3 kt, 1.5 kt, 10 kt, to 50 kt.
One kiloton is equivalent to the explosive power of 1,000 tons of TNT.
If the US deploys tactical nuclear weapons at US military bases in Korea, they would become a primary target of North Korea's attack.
China and Russia would also react negatively.
If the US deploys tactical nuclear weapons in Guam or on the US mainland, it can respond flexibly not only to the Korean Peninsula but also to the regional situation.
US strategic bombers equipped with tactical nuclear weapons can arrive on the Korean Peninsula within 2-3 hours.
From the US perspective, which emphasizes "strategic flexibility," there is little benefit to be gained from stationing tactical nuclear weapons permanently at US military bases in Korea.
One thing to be cautious about in discussing tactical nuclear weapons is the misconception that strategic nuclear weapons with enormous destructive power are "unusable" (for deterrence), while tactical nuclear weapons with reduced destructive power are "usable" (for actual combat).
Generally, nuclear weapons with a yield of 100-20 kt are classified as tactical nuclear weapons.
The distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons originated from the standards of the US and the Soviet Union, which were continental countries with large land areas and distant city intervals during the Cold War era.
There is also a buffer zone like the Pacific Ocean between the US and the Soviet Union.
The US standard of distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is difficult to apply to the Korean Peninsula.
This is because the Korean Peninsula has a small land area and high population density in major cities.
Seoul is right next to the Demilitarized Zone, and if tactical nuclear weapons are used in North Korean territory, radioactive fallout cannot be avoided.
In 2005, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) under the US Department of Defense conducted a simulation and found that if a 20 kt nuclear bomb, the size of a tactical nuclear weapon, were to explode in Yongsan, Seoul, about 1.13 million people would die and a total of about 2.75 million people would be casualties.
The distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons does not have much meaning for us.
The atomic bombs dropped by the US on Hiroshima (15 kt) and Nagasaki (21 kt) in Japan in August 1945 were tactical nuclear weapons by US standards.
About 140,000 people died in Hiroshima and about 74,000 in Nagasaki by December 1945.
Translated by urgent.news from Hankyoreh's report; automated translation may contain errors. Machine-written — it may contain errors, so check the original before relying on it.