Information Timing and Release: The Gaming of Guidance!
I am a lapsed academic, insofar as I have not submitted a paper for publication in more than two decades, but to acquire academic status, I did have to earn a PhD in the distant past. My doctoral dissertation , which like most doctoral theses is little noted and long forgotten, was completed in 1984 and focused on how the frequency of and delays in the release of information plays out in stock…
In recent years, there have been two major discussions in the financial world that draw parallels, despite seemingly unrelated actions. The first is the Securities Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposal to replace quarterly reporting of financial statements for companies with semi-annual reporting. The second is Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh's suggestion that the Fed should provide less guidance on future decisions to financial markets.
Both of these proposals aim to reduce the amount of information that markets receive and use to calibrate prices. However, the arguments for and against each proposal have similarities. The supporters of removing quarterly reports argue that they contribute to market myopia and increase short-termism, while those opposing the reduced Fed guidance believe that such guidance creates gaming among traders and investors, shifting focus from fundamentals.
Critics of both proposals claim that withholding such information from markets will make prices more volatile and less informative. However, as with most debates, there is a mix of truth and exaggeration on both sides. The purpose of this report is to explore the complexities of these issues without reiterating the original source's content word-for-word.
Written by urgent.news from Musings on Markets's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
