THORChain lost $10.7M to a fix that was already written
THORChain lost about $10.7M to an exploit its own developers had already fixed. Not "had a fix in progress". Not "were working on it". The patch had been written, tested, and scheduled to ship. The deployment automation failed, and the fix never reached production. That detail makes this case more useful than most exploit writeups, because almost every resilient team is one broken pipeline away…
THORChain suffered a $10.7 million loss due to an exploit that its own developers had already fixed. The fix was written, tested, and scheduled to be deployed, but an issue in the deployment automation prevented it from reaching production. This case is more insightful than most exploit writeups, as it highlights the importance of a robust deployment pipeline.
The attacker exploited a proposer-forgery bug in Bifrost's attestation gossip layer, intercepting deposit observations and converting them into outbound payment requests. The signature covered the payload but not the direction, allowing the validator signatures to be indistinguishable between "saw this event" and "pay this out."
Since the fix was not deployed, the vulnerability remained live for exploitation. This incident emphasizes the critical role of the deployment pipeline in security and the need to treat it as a security-critical component.
Rewritten by urgent.news; may contain errors — check the original.