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OPTIMJACK: how 178 sites served a card skimmer from a trusted CDN (and why CSP allowlisting can't save you)

On 16 November 2026, visitors to 178 organizations' websites — Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger, Peacock — were served a card skimmer, a crypto clipper and two iOS exploit kits. None of those companies had a breach. The code arrived from cdn.optimizely.com , with Optimizely's certificate, in a script tag the sites had used for years. Scott Helme of Report URI…

On November 16, 2026, 178 companies' websites were compromised by a card skimmer, crypto clipper, and two iOS exploit kits served from Optimizely's CDN. None of the companies had experienced a breach. Scott Helme of Report URI analyzed 1,611 Optimizely snippets and discovered 188 infected across 178 organizations. Optimizely acknowledged a vulnerability in their Experimentation feature and stated it had been fixed.

No CVE was assigned, and the technical details of the flaw remained unpublished. The Optimizely Web Experimentation loads a per-project snippet from their CDN, which contains a field called Project JavaScript (projectJS) where customers can write custom code. The attacker inserted a loader into that field for multiple unrelated projects and left the rest unchanged.

Three loader variants were identified: the first one was a plain tag (most snippets), the second one was a base64-encoded URL, and the third one was an inline payload executed via eval() when the domain was blocked. The payload conducted several actions, such as crypto address replacement across various cryptocurrencies, card skimming, cookie and screenshot theft, and iOS stage attacks.

The payload was rebuilt 26 times that day. The Content Security Policy (CSP) data was crucial in analyzing the incident. Report URI crawled 256 affected organizations' hosts and evaluated their policies against the payload's requirements. Organizations without a Content Policy (CSP) had 68 allowed, and 50 of those sites allowed the payload to run.

However, 24 sites (15%) managed to block the theft successfully. Allowing scripts from specific hosts instead of Optimizely's CDN could have prevented the attack. Customers who self-hosted the snippet were also affected because the content still originated from the same Optimizely project. Optimizely's own sites were included in the list.

The payload attempted to replace crypto addresses in page text, form fields, links, images, clipboard, outgoing fetch/XHR, window.open, and iOS share sheet. Additionally, it added a skimmer at 13:43 UTC, monitored form submissions and fetch/XHR POSTs for valid card details, and injected a fake card form into hosted payment gateways.

The attacker also stole cookies, screenshots, and other data. While Optimizely's certificate was valid, and their servers were up, the company's customers were advised to audit their Project JavaScript and experiment code for any suspicious activity, rotate credentials and API tokens, and consider moving card capture to hosted fields or a hosted checkout.

Implementing a CSP in report-only mode and restricting script-src and connect-src were recommended to enhance security.

Written by urgent.news from Dev.to's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.

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