LZB, ERTMS y CDI 113 + 200: una semana descifrando los 17 minutos del accidente de Urda
Ocho días después de la tragedia, las claves de lo ocurrido están en los audios completos del centro de Atocha, los datos de sus pantallas y los interrogatorios a una veintena de personas
On Wednesday, October 28th at 6:30am, a worker at Adif's control center in Atocha, Madrid, began their shift with a half-hour meeting. They were informed about how high-speed operations were progressing at the time. More than two hours later, the LZB safety system, which prevents two trains from colliding at the same point, malfunctioned on a stretch of over 63 kilometers of high-speed line connecting Madrid to Sevilla.
Seven trains immediately came to a halt. At 8:30am, this worker instructed the AVE 2080 to resume service at normal speed, despite the protocol specifying it should proceed at a slow enough speed (slow motion) to stop if an obstacle appears on the track. Just 17 minutes later, this train, traveling between 160 and 200 kilometers per hour, slammed into a stationary IRyo at the Urda station (Toledo), causing at least 69 deaths and hundreds of injuries.
Written by urgent.news from El Pais's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
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