Why South Africa's local elections matter

In 2011 and 2012, the South African trade union federation Cosatu first proposed the concept of a "Lula Moment" for South Africa. This phrase was never intended for political hero worship, but rather as a strategic turning point when a society faces economic stagnation, inequality, political paralysis, and popular discontent, and must choose to either continue down a failing path or pursue a bold developmental shift.

Looking back in 2026, it appears that South Africa was faced with such a moment nearly 20 years ago, yet failed to capitalize on it. The concept of a Lula Moment is worth revisiting, as many of the conditions that led to it still persist. South Africa continues to struggle with mass unemployment, extreme inequality, deindustrialization, weak growth, growing insecurity, and declining confidence in political institutions.

Brazil, after years of turbulence, has once again become a focal point in the global struggle between progressive and far-right forces. The dramatic events surrounding Lula's 2026 election victory offer insights into the current global moment and challenges faced by progressive forces worldwide, including in South Africa.

The origins of the Lula Moment in South Africa lie in a highly volatile period of political history. The ANC's 2007 Polokwane conference marked a significant internal rupture in the liberation movement since 1994. The ousting of Thabo Mbeki by Jacob Zuma was not merely a leadership contest, but a broader battle over the direction of the movement and the democratic project itself.

The shift in economic policy towards fiscal conservatism, inflation targeting, trade liberalization, and market-centered reforms, known as Gear, began in 1996. Many within the Tripartite Alliance regarded this as a strategic departure from transformative objectives that had animated the democratic breakthrough. Frustrations over this trajectory steadily accumulated, leading to the adoption of policy alternatives and the promotion of stronger industrial policy and a break from prevailing economic orthodoxy.

However, two major errors were made. Firstly, there was a failure to acknowledge the history of progressive resolutions being ignored, diluted, or blocked once they reached government level. Powerful institutional centers, particularly within economic bureaucracy, continued to exert significant influence over policy regardless of mandates from conferences and alliance processes.

Secondly, there was a misreading of Jacob Zuma himself. Some in the labor movement and broader Alliance accepted Zuma's self-presentation as a friend of workers and critic of elitism, a major political error.

By 2010, it became increasingly evident to Cosatu leaders that neither the anticipated policy shift nor the desired developmental transformation was being realized. The anticipated economic framework continued to fail in addressing structural unemployment, poverty, inequality, and deindustrialization, while the emergence of predatory forms of accumulation centered on access to state institutions also became apparent.

In 2010, Cosatu General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi and the author drafted a discussion paper for the Cosatu Central Executive Committee, warning of the dangers of institutionalized corruption within the state and society. Cosatu called for the convening of a civil society conference to address these issues, highlighting the need for a strategic opening that had emerged during the Polokwane conference.