It’s time the UN considered letting others do the delivering

The United Nations is once again grappling with the necessity for reform, a recurring theme in the organization's history. As new crises emerge, the UN finds itself expanding, adding layers of support and structures to manage the growing responsibilities. However, these structures can become permanent fixtures, even as the needs and priorities shift and resources dwindle.

The current reform process, UN80, is therefore timely and crucial. Streamlining positions, consolidating functions and supply chains, relocating activities to more cost-effective locations, and eliminating redundancies can result in significant savings. Yet, will these measures suffice? The UN has previously undergone periods of retrenchment, abolishing positions, consolidating structures, and reducing expenditures.

Yet, when funding improves, the organizations invariably expand once more, responding to new priorities and demands. Given the current financial strain, perhaps a more fundamental question should be posed: not merely how the humanitarian system can carry out its existing functions more cost-effectively, but whether international organizations should be solely responsible for all these functions.

One idea that merits serious consideration is a more substantial role for the private sector in humanitarian delivery. Businesses already supply a wide range of goods and services to humanitarian organizations, including food, vehicles, fuel, technology, transport, warehousing, and more. However, humanitarian organizations typically assemble these inputs into their own delivery systems.

What if, under certain circumstances, private operators were contracted to handle more of the chain, from procurement through logistics to final distribution, while humanitarian organizations defined the required outcomes, established standards and safeguards, and independently verified performance? This is not an argument for the inherent efficiency of private companies or a claim that such a model would work everywhere.

Rather, it is a proposition worth testing: could competition, commercial incentives, and the adaptability of businesses deliver certain humanitarian outcomes more efficiently and at a lower cost than maintaining permanent institutional capacity to deliver them directly? During my humanitarian career, I was involved in an operation that took place in a war-torn region, where a large population had become extremely difficult to reach.

The situation was particularly challenging and isolated, with no normal economic or social life. Negotiating access was a complex task that required considerable senior management time and involved several ambassadors. Eventually, a direct distribution operation was mounted, which, despite the extensive administrative and security protocols of the UN, proved to be costlier than expected.

Simultaneously, a private operator took over the operation, handling procurement, transport, and distribution. Commercial actors navigated the challenging environment and managed to execute the operation at a lower cost than the initial direct operation. What was particularly striking was that, despite the immense difficulty in securing humanitarian access, commercial activity began to emerge within the affected area.

Reports from inside the region indicated that commercial networks were finding ways to serve the population, even with limited resources. This experience left me with a lingering question about the objective of humanitarian access: should it be to secure access for the humanitarian organization itself, or to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches the people who need it?

The two objectives are not necessarily the same. Recent reports from Gaza shed light on this issue. Despite the destruction, insecurity, restrictions, and humanitarian need, commercial activity has continued. The UN office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs reported 884 commercial lorryloads entering Gaza in a single week, with 290 carrying non-essential goods.

This demonstrates that commercial networks can persist in difficult operating environments. While profit may be an incentive for commercial operators, it cannot exist without demand, and effective demand requires purchasing power. In Gaza, despite the extraordinary circumstances, one might not have expected sufficient purchasing power to sustain meaningful commercial activity.

Yet, trade persists, indicating that commercial networks can be highly resilient and adaptable. We should explore what markets and private operators can achieve as part of humanitarian response more systematically.