El hackeo de $6.3B no fue un bug de código
El hackeo de $6.3B no fue un bug de código Fecha: 2026-10-30 · Base medida: diez repositorios públicos con workflow de despliegue, con el commit exacto de cada medición fijado en la tabla. Origen de las cifras: medición propia y reproducible. Cada cifra de este artículo tiene su commit; el desglose por código está más abajo, no en un anexo. Lo que sí está confirmado, y lo que la prensa todavía…
On October 30th, 2026, eight major news outlets reported the same story: a $6.3 billion to $6.4 billion heist from cryptocurrency, attributed by TRM Labs to North Korea. The incident involved the use of Ethereum's EIP-7702, which allows a wallet to delegate its signing capability to another contract, leading to drained hot wallets.
However, a closer look reveals that EIP-7702 was not the root cause of the hack, but rather an amplifier of the losses. In addition, it was confirmed that the exploit involved a compromised engineer's laptop, not just code vulnerabilities. The core issue lies in the chain of authority, not the code line itself. An audit of GitHub Actions found eight issues, with three being particularly significant.
These issues include overly permissive permissions, floating tags enabling code execution, and the delegation that converts a signature into permanent authority. Fixing these issues involved reducing root permissions, limiting specific permissions to the deploy job, and documenting exceptions instead of silencing the instrument.
The final outcome was a zero-hallucination report, demonstrating the effectiveness of the audit process.
Written by urgent.news from Dev.to's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
