The SCO after 2022: Russian Ambitions and Reality
Anton Barbashin on how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a useful but secondary Eurasian forum for Moscow, became an important platform
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), once a secondary foreign-policy consideration for Russia, took on a new significance following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the years preceding the invasion, the SCO had largely fulfilled its original mandate of promoting regional security and managing post-Soviet transition. However, by the mid-2010s, stagnation set in, and the organization required a revitalization.
In 2015-2017, the SCO experienced a surge in membership expansion, bringing India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus on board. This global reach expanded, yet it also posed challenges to the organization's collective decision-making capability. The SCO had initially been envisioned as a security-focused entity, but it had never been able to effectively mediate a significant conflict among its members, as demonstrated during the 2022 Ukraine conflict.
Following the war's onset, the SCO's importance for Russia skyrocketed. The organization became a platform for Moscow to propagate its vision of a multipolar world and counter Western narratives. Moscow aimed to showcase that Russia was not isolated and remained a viable partner despite Western sanctions. At the 2022 SCO summit in Samarkand, Putin emphasized the organization's global weight, asserting that over half of the world's population lived within SCO member states, which accounted for a quarter of global GDP and possessed substantial natural resources.
Putin's rhetoric sought to position the SCO as an alternative to the transatlantic community, which he portrayed as an American instrument of dictatorship that forces European countries to impose sanctions against Russia. However, Moscow did not demand open support for its actions but rather solidarity in opposing sanctions and Western interventionism.
The SCO was expected to refrain from openly condemning Russia's actions, abstain from relevant UN votes, avoid joining Western sanctions, and refrain from providing substantial military or other support to Ukraine. Russia's realistic expectations from the SCO were far more modest than its initial ambitious plans, as even close ally Belarus still does not recognize Crimea as part of Russia.
Written by urgent.news from Riddle Russia's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
