BRICS+ Series: Iran & The Eurasian Union

On October 21st, Iran's Minister of Industry, Mines, and Trade, Mohammad Atabak, and Andrey Slepnev, the Eurasian Economic Commission's minister overseeing trade, reiterated their mutual goal of boosting trade between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). According to TV BRICS and Pars Today, Atabak stated Iran possesses the necessary infrastructure and resources to support increased exchanges.

The EAEU has listed products it desires, while Tehran has compiled its own list based on production capacity and domestic needs. The statement lacked specific numbers and timelines, but its importance lies in its foundation. The meeting followed the implementation of a comprehensive free trade agreement in May 2025, superseding a temporary arrangement that had been in effect since 2019.

The average customs tariff on EAEU exports to Iran would decrease from 20% to 4.5%, with preferential terms covering approximately 90% of goods. Experts cited by the report projected that annual trade could reach $12 billion. Momentum has persisted, with a three-year cooperation roadmap signed in the autumn of 2025, with Slepnev describing the partnership as a "qualitatively new level of interaction" at a Kyrgyzstan summit.

Iranian news outlet Eghtesad Online reported a 22% increase in trade during the agreement's inaugural year. However, verifying these figures is challenging, necessitating caution.

The rationale is clear for Iran and the EAEU. For Iran, the union provides a customs territory on its northern borders that is not reliant on Western financial channels. Conversely, Iran offers a substantial market and a southern pathway to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean for the EAEU. Russia plays a central role, as bilateral Russian-Iranian trade increased from approximately $1.5 billion in 2020 to around $5 billion in 2023, according to Jamestown Foundation figures.

Russia exports significantly more to Iran, with nearly $4 billion in exports compared to Iran's $1 billion in exports. This disparity highlights a persistent currency mismatch and volatile exchange rates, which can disadvantage exporters. Iran and Russia still price deals in dollars, converting them later, which can lead to disputes.

Efforts to connect national payment systems and settle in local currencies have increased, covering the majority of Iran-Russia transactions, but do not fully eliminate the issue. The physical infrastructure also matters significantly. The Rasht-Astara railway, spanning about 160 kilometers between Iran and Azerbaijan, is intended to complete the North-South Transport Corridor.

TASS reported that the project's cost is €1.6 billion, with Russia and Iran jointly financing construction, with implementation set to begin on April 1, 2026. Until its completion, much of the trade will rely on slower and more expensive routes, regardless of tariff reductions. Atabak's focus on "technical matters affecting trade" underscores this point.

Product lists and tariff schedules are relatively straightforward, but certification standards, customs procedures, banking channels, and freight capacity are crucial in determining whether goods actually move. Three key tests will determine whether this is merely rhetoric or substantive progress. First, whether the two sides transform their product lists into actual schedules.

Second, whether trade expands beyond Russia to include Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. Third, whether the Rasht-Astara railway is constructed on schedule. A structural concern remains. Trade influenced by sanctions pressure is only as resilient as the underlying politics, and EAEU members face varying levels of exposure to Western measures.

While the ambition is promising, and the legal framework exists, actual trade will depend on infrastructure, payment systems, and paperwork.