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Covert CIA and Mossad operations inside Iran ahead of a possible new war - opinion

Tehran is betting that economic pressure and US elections will force concessions, but its intelligence vulnerabilities could reshape the strategic balance.

As the possibility of renewed hostilities between Iran and the United States or Israel looms, the focus shifts from initial strikes to the covert intelligence operations unfolding within Iran. In its ninth month of conflict, Iran persists in employing nuclear blackmail, global energy security threats, and prolonged negotiations to preserve its existence. President Trump must decide between accepting a deal that enables Tehran to rebuild, or maintaining pressure until Tehran's security threats are genuinely constrained.

The CIA and Mossad's intelligence capabilities, especially their ability to identify and assess weaknesses within Tehran's security forces, could prove crucial. Despite claiming peace, Iranian officials consistently demand unrealistic terms from Washington. Iranian officials, like Mohsen Rezaei and Abbas Araghchi, continue to reject compromise and use the negotiation process to maintain leverage and buy time.

Intelligence warfare favors the side that endures prolonged negotiations. Tehran may exploit rising oil prices, American voter anxiety, and upcoming midterm elections to pressure Trump into concessions. However, a prolonged crisis could provide Washington and Israel valuable opportunities to gather intelligence, evaluate military power, and uncover vulnerabilities within Iran's security system.

While the direct involvement of the CIA in these activities remains unconfirmed, US-Israeli intelligence cooperation is well-documented.

For Tehran's Shi'ite regime, the most significant threat goes beyond American air power or Israeli missiles. It lies in the possibility of intelligence infiltration into the very institutions sustaining the regime: the IRGC, counterintelligence agencies, national security decision-making centers, nuclear networks, and the compromised Intelligence Ministry. A regime incapable of safeguarding its secrets, personnel, and command structure is strategically vulnerable, regardless of its military arsenal.

The Strait of Hormuz exacerbates the asymmetric confrontation. Iran attributes the blockage of three oil tankers to Iranian naval mines, though independent verification is lacking. Tehran aims to weaponize maritime insecurity and energy market uncertainty, potentially raising insurance premiums, transportation costs, and oil prices. Precise intelligence on Iran's maritime capabilities is crucial to distinguishing genuine threats from coercive bluffing and avoiding strategic errors.

Iran's asymmetric warfare extends beyond the Persian Gulf. For decades, Tehran's regime has leveraged terrorist militias, intelligence networks, cyberoperations, and proxies to project power and threaten adversaries. Allegations of Iranian involvement in unrest in France must be verified, but Washington cannot afford to view Tehran's transnational threats solely through the nuclear prism.

The regime's reluctance to abandon enriched uranium raises a critical question: If the regime genuinely seeks resolution, why retain one of its most potent strategic bargaining tools? Enrichment alone does not confirm intentions to build nuclear weapons, but uranium stockpiles, centrifuge capacity, and verification are essential in assessing nuclear breakout risks.

Any agreement that leaves these vulnerabilities unresolved risks providing Tehran with the time and strategic breathing space needed to rebuild. For the CIA and Mossad, the strategic imperative is to provide accurate, independent intelligence that reveals Tehran's capabilities, weaknesses, and intentions. However, covert operations cannot replace a comprehensive national strategy or guarantee regime collapse.

Intelligence achievements may weaken an adversary, but lasting strategic change necessitates political, economic, social, and security pressure working together. Trump must distinguish between ending hostilities and neutralizing the Islamic Republic's criminal ruling apparatus. Destroying weapons, damaging facilities, and degrading IRGC capabilities does not necessarily dismantle the regime's command structure.

Written by urgent.news from Jerusalem Post's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.

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