With FARC’s Political Party Over, Colombia’s Peace Accord Faces Deadline

Nine years after Colombia signed its historic peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an essential political promise of the Final Accord is nearing its end. Comunes, the political party formed by the last FARC leadership and guerrilla warlords, has lost its legal status after failing to secure enough support in the 2026 congressional elections.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the post-conflict tribunal established to prosecute crimes against humanity, is facing budget disputes, a looming deadline, and growing criticism for its slow pace of delivering justice. These events are difficult to ignore, as the political vehicle designed to integrate the FARC into Colombian democracy has failed to develop a significant electoral base.

Meanwhile, the JEP is under pressure to demonstrate that its exceptional powers can yield meaningful results before its mandate expires. Neither development invalidates the peace agreement, but both raise a crucial question: after years of institutional guarantees, substantial public spending, and political tension over impunity, can Colombia prove that the promises made in 2016 have resulted in lasting political legitimacy and timely justice for victims?

Former FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt has called for the JEP to be "shut down," arguing that it was created as a mechanism to enrich some while ensuring impunity for the FARC. She believes ending the tribunal would help fulfill the promise of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition for victims. This week, Colombia's National Electoral Council (CNE) officially confirmed the loss of Comunes' legal status through Resolution 4006.

After securing only 114,000 Senate votes in the March elections, far less than the required 3% of valid votes, the former guerrilla leader Sandra Ramírez, who ran for re-election, received only 10,505 votes. The end of Comunes' legal status does not mean the expulsion of former combatants from democratic politics or the voiding of the peace agreement.

Instead, it illustrates that the political project born from the Havana accord did not gain sufficient support from Colombia's 40 million voters to maintain its institutional existence. The March 8 election proved Comunes' failure as a party, and its former representatives can now participate in politics through other means. However, the exceptional guarantees that once allowed them a seat in Congress have now been lost.

The more pressing test may involve the JEP, which was established as part of the agreement's transitional justice system. The tribunal's mission was to investigate serious crimes committed during the conflict, including kidnappings, forced disappearances, sexual violence, and extrajudicial executions, while also establishing the truth, determining responsibility, providing justice to victims, and preventing future violence.

Over 260,000 lives were lost, and millions were displaced during Colombia's armed conflict. The peace agreement marked a historic turning point, and the decision to allow the FARC to participate in civilian politics was a significant departure from the military and political deadlock that had persisted for generations. Nonetheless, an indefinite delay is not an acceptable solution.

On October 1, former President Juan Manuel Santos, the architect of the peace agreement and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, criticized the JEP's slow progress and urged it to complete its work by 2028, ideally earlier. Santos' intervention, given his role in negotiating the settlement, cannot be dismissed as opposition to the peace process; it highlights a fundamental issue within the agreement: transitional justice must ultimately transition from investigation to accountability.

The budget dispute over the JEP's 2027 allocation, which would see a COP 170 billion reduction, has intensified the conflict. The tribunal has warned that the cuts could significantly disrupt its operations.