Fix the RAF before seeking new revenue streams from South Africans

The Road Accident Fund (RAF) requires urgent reform rather than new revenue sources before South Africans are asked to contribute further. A former businessman and civil activist, Wayne Duvenage, argues that the RAF's crisis stems from weak leadership, poor administration, and inadequate oversight rather than a failure of revenue collection. The Department of Transport recently considered alternative funding methods, including a third-party insurance scheme, but dismissed the more pressing issues at hand.

Electric and hybrid vehicles make up less than 1% of the current car park and are expected to remain a small fraction of South Africa's fleet for the next decade, according to the source. The RAF's crisis is not due to the government's inability to extract funds from motorists; instead, it is characterized by wasteful spending, inefficient systems, weak oversight, and poor leadership. Introducing a new payment mechanism would only feed a broken system and potentially introduce additional administrative costs.

The fuel levy is a simple and effective method for funding road-accident compensation, as it is automatically collected without the need for separate annual accounts or premium-collection bureaucracies. It also approximates a user-pays system, where those who drive more contribute more. Replacing the levy with a large annual charge or hybrid version could create affordability issues for households and small businesses, especially as electric vehicles eventually require a supplementary contribution mechanism.

Historically, South Africa introduced compulsory third-party motor insurance in 1942, but the system had issues such as falsification, evasion, uninsured vehicles, disputes over valid cover, and gaps in protection. The government switched to fuel-levy funding in 1986, which was implemented under the RAF under the 1996 legislation.

Introducing a new vehicle-based annual payment system would revive questions about enforcement, policing, and consequences for non-compliance, as South Africa already struggles with vehicle licensing and roadworthiness.

The RAF has not been starved of money; in fact, RAF revenue grew from approximately R12.5-billion in 2010 to over R50-billion in 2024/25. However, performance deteriorated during the same period, with employee costs increasing significantly. The RAF's cost structure has become detached from acceptable performance, not due to a lack of revenue. The government should stop seeking more money to feed an inefficient, bloated, and broken machine, and instead focus on fixing the RAF.