How Cloudflare addressed a cross-tenant data exposure vulnerability in Containers
On September 4, 2026, security researcher Oren Yomtov from Accomplish responsibly disclosed a vulnerability impacting Cloudflare Containers and Cloudflare Sandboxes, both built on Cloudflare's Containers platform. This issue was reported via Cloudflare's bug bounty program. Cloudflare has since fully addressed the vulnerability and found no evidence of data compromise. Accomplish and Oren Yomtov collaborated on this report, which details the nature of the vulnerability and Cloudflare's response.
Cloudflare Containers operate on multi-tenant infrastructure, automatically assigning workloads to eligible servers without customer input. The researchers demonstrated that a customer using a Workers Paid account could potentially recover residual disk blocks from previous containers on the same host. This technique was not targeted at specific customers, workloads, hosts, or data, and the presence of residual data was not guaranteed.
Cloudflare's solution involved applying a fix across the Containers fleet, requiring no changes from customers. The vulnerability stemmed from Linux device mapper thin provisioning (dm-thin), which allocates physical storage only when a virtual disk writes to an unmapped region. The affected storage pools used 64 KiB thin-block size.
When a container's root disk was deleted, its physical blocks were returned to a shared pool serving multiple customer accounts. If a previously used 64 KiB block was reassigned, a full-block write replaced its content, but a smaller write could alter only the modified portion, potentially retaining data from the previous user.
The researchers performed a proof of concept by aligning 64 KiB regions corresponding to free space in the guest's ext4 filesystem and writing 4 KiB blocks into each. Upon reaching an unmapped thin block, dm-thin allocated a physical 64 KiB block, replacing only the written portion and leaving the remaining 60 KiB intact. Subsequent reads could thus detect residual data from previous containers.
After the submission, the researchers confirmed no third-party identifiers or content were retained. They also verified that the recovered data was securely deleted, aligning with Cloudflare's HackerOne disclosure policy. The vulnerability could potentially allow a customer to access residual data from other customers' Containers on the same host, crossing the tenant-isolation boundary and exposing filesystem metadata, directory structures, database pages, and application data.
However, the researchers did not demonstrate any malicious modification or impact to workload availability. The fix involved removing the skip_block_zeroing option from the dm-thin pool configuration, restoring the default behavior of clearing newly allocated blocks before exposing them to containers.
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