Demining Syria: How Not to Let Word Games Bury the Work

On September 22, 2015, while serving as a driver in an infantry fighting vehicle, I was involved in an accident with an anti-tank mine. The event felt strange, as I was standing among the ruins in Syria, a country that had also suffered devastation from Russian mines and shells just a year earlier. As part of a Ukrainian delegation on an official visit to Syria, we engaged in discussions with local colleagues on how to restore areas destroyed by war.

The connection between these experiences resonated with me, as the consequences of attacks on civilian infrastructure by Russian and Assad forces have been well documented. However, witnessing the destruction firsthand is a different matter. Two days prior, on September 20, we had signed an intergovernmental agreement on mine action cooperation in Damascus.

This was followed by field visits to Idlib and Aleppo, where we examined local response teams, the impact of destruction on neighborhoods, and the performance of Ukrainian technologies. While the two-day visit was limited, I found myself reflecting on the issues I had encountered during my first visit to Ukraine. In a March column, I had previously suggested that Ukraine could assist Syrians in building a mine action system by sharing our experiences and lessons learned.

However, during this visit, I was more focused on the discrepancy between the rhetoric surrounding the establishment of such systems, the expectations placed upon them, and the actual implementation. In Aleppo, I visited a district in ruins where people were already clearing the area and attempting to rebuild what could still be salvaged.

The Syrian government's objective is to shift individuals from temporary shelter to permanent homes. As I stood amidst a mixture of concrete, steel, bricks, and household waste, I contemplated the challenges I often mention in meetings: the construction of a mine action system, the methodologies employed, and the experience drawn upon.

Yet, I struggled to envision how these discussions could facilitate the clearance of these areas within realistic timeframes and resource constraints. Ukraine's experience in humanitarian demining, despite its simpler conditions, demonstrates the expense and sluggish pace of such efforts. The complexity of the situation in Syria is far greater, and replicating familiar approaches appears likely to incur additional costs and prolong the process.

My initial thought was to incorporate remotely operated equipment more extensively. Mechanized methods are already governed by international standards. However, I question whether all the prerequisites for executing the work remain essential given the technological advancements available today. To what extent can robotics transform our procedures?

We must ensure the safety of the operation and the eventual safety of the land. Simultaneously, when an alternative method to achieve a safe outcome becomes accessible, we must also consider whether a specific requirement remains pertinent. This inquiry pertains to both the operators' procedures and the standards themselves. Over the years, we have amassed experience in adhering to these standards, and they should not be immune to scrutiny or modification.

It is crucial that their legitimacy is not taken for granted. What troubles me most is that even if we consistently adhere to the right words, construct a system around them, and still fail to address whether the system can fulfill its intended purpose. If clearance necessitates funds that cannot be obtained and timelines that leave individuals uncertain about their return home, the practical value of the proposed approach is called into question.

Another pertinent question is the extent to which the nation itself can influence the selection of methodologies and the planning of the work. Syrian colleagues are expanding response teams, seeking equipment, and striving to ensure that the national center can effectively coordinate the sector. Parallel to these efforts, international programs are being implemented, each with its own budget, procedures, and priorities.

According to the information we received, government approvals are being procured, and work is being executed in response to government requests. Nonetheless, it seems that operators largely concur among themselves on the allocation of work, while the national center plays a limited role in these specific decisions. I comprehend the rationale behind organizations collaborating: work must persist, duplication must be avoided, and a state institution's capacity does not develop instantaneously.

Nevertheless, I wish to comprehend how this practice will evolve into a system that the country itself can manage. Syrians are striving to assume greater responsibility. To what degree does the collaboration among partners assist them in gradually gaining a corresponding say in decision-making? If we wait for the center to attain sufficient capacity while concurrently coordinating the primary operations among ourselves, where will that capacity originate from?

Supporting a national institution also necessitates adjustments in how its partners operate. It entails involving the local team in planning while decisions are still subject to change, elucidating the limitations of our own programs, and working together to align them with the country's requirements. At times, this may prove more challenging than reaching an agreement among a few seasoned international organizations.

However, learning to coordinate a sector without assuming a significant role in the decision-making process is arduous. Training and guidance are indispensable, yet they do not replace active participation in the decision-making process. Similarly, individual arrangements with farmers, the energy sector, and other government entities all have pressing needs.

Assisting them is essential. The question is how these arrangements integrate into an overarching plan and what role the institution being constructed plays in this process. I do not anticipate the Syrian center to dictate every deployment or determine the execution of every task. Operators possess their own areas of expertise and responsibilities.