Israel needs a thin constitution to bridge its political divide - opinion

In a groundbreaking political development, opposition leaders in Israel have jointly outlined a set of principles for their anticipated government. The four key areas of focus are: sharing national responsibilities equally, establishing an inquiry into the October 7th failures, implementing term limits for prime ministers, and establishing a constitution.

Addressing these issues is of utmost national importance. Without equitable burden-sharing, Israel's military, economic, and social functions will falter; without an inquiry, future failures can't be prevented, nor can the suffering of victims be adequately addressed; term limits are essential for introducing fresh perspectives into leadership and curbing corruption; and a constitution serves as a crucial social and legal framework for preserving Israeli democracy's stability.

While the first three measures can be swiftly implemented via legislation and garner broad public support, adopting a constitution poses significant challenges. It is a multifaceted legal, cultural, and social endeavor, potentially the most formidable challenge a legislature can undertake, and will require considerable time. Moreover, while the opposition enjoys considerable backing for the first three measures, opinions diverge on the extent and specifics of burden-sharing and the constitution's content.

History has shown that Israel's attempts at forming a constitution have repeatedly faltered. The country has become even more polarized since previous attempts, intensifying the challenge.

An ordinary coalition majority can enact legislation governing the first three topics, whereas constitutional provisions demand broader support. A constitution provides long-term stability only if it is entrenched, preventing future coalition majorities from amending it through a simple majority. However, for the constitution to have lasting legitimacy, it must be adopted by broad public support. Without such support, its legitimacy is called into question, and instability may worsen.

Despite these challenges, opposition leaders are correct in placing the constitutional challenge on Israel's national agenda. The question remains: how can a constitution advance after the election, and what should be the proper path forward?

A comprehensive constitution would tackle three critical questions: the state's core identity (who are we?), a bill of rights (what do we believe in?), and the institutions of government (how do we manage our shared life?). Given Israel's polarization, achieving broad agreement on the first two questions appears unfeasible. Even if the opposition parties reach consensus on these matters, their professional and public legitimacy would be insufficient to entrench those arrangements, necessitating a supermajority for any future amendments.

Would opposition leaders accept constitutional provisions adopted by the current coalition requiring an 80-MK supermajority for future amendments? The ancient teachings of Hillel the Elder and Immanuel Kant suggest that one should not impose on others what they would not accept for themselves.

However, there is a path to stabilize Israel through a partial constitutional settlement – a "thin constitution" focusing on the relationship among the branches of government. The intense judicial reform debate reveals the intensity of disagreement, but the prospects for broad agreement are comparatively higher due to the nature of these questions.

Most Israelis, including supporters of the opposition parties and the liberal camp, favor measured changes in the branches' relationship. If a thin constitution establishes fair and effective rules that all sides regard as just and efficient from an impartial perspective (without knowing if they will be in the coalition or opposition), it can garner broad support. Adopting such a constitution could pave the way for the reforms Israel urgently needs.