Russia is stepping up fake Ukrainian government pages as bait for recruiting agents, Ukraine’s security service says

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has reported that Russia has significantly increased the creation of fake websites and social media pages posing as Ukrainian state bodies and media outlets. These fraudulent pages are primarily used to disseminate disinformation and pilfer personal data, which can subsequently be utilized for recruiting agents. The SBU has already blocked numerous duplicates of their own branding.

The primary objective of these phony pages is to destabilize the internal situation in Ukraine and damage its international standing. In addition to their ongoing full-scale invasion, Russia is actively engaged in a cyber war against Ukraine through espionage, sabotage, and the recruitment of agents within the nation. Each agent Russia manages to entice and integrate into their ranks contributes to directing missiles and drones towards Ukrainian targets.

Upon infiltrating the accounts of users who subscribe to these fake pages and messenger channels, Russians extract the stolen data for recruitment purposes and to gather confidential information. Moscow's primary interest lies in the combat and operational capabilities of Ukraine's defense and security forces.

In September, the SBU's cybersecurity department discovered and blocked over 50 resources that replicated the agency's own branding and positioning. It's important to note that Russia's digital arsenal extends beyond these deceptive pages. In the same month, Anthropic revealed that Russian spies were utilizing the Claude AI chatbot to carry out a campaign against Kyiv.

To protect themselves, Ukrainians are advised not to click on suspicious links and to verify information only through official sources. In the event of encountering dubious web addresses or messages purportedly from an SBU officer, individuals should immediately contact the 1516 hotline. The SBU's recent reports highlight the tasks assigned to Russia's recruited agents.

For instance, a mobilized soldier allegedly recruited by Russia's Federal Security Service attempted to route a Russian missile strike towards his own unit in Kharkiv Oblast. Another case involved a resident of Lviv Oblast who was allegedly recruited to guide a missile strike on a drone production site in western Ukraine, aiming to disrupt the supply of drones to Ukrainian forces.

Additionally, a 17-year-old military intelligence (GRU) agent, apprehended in November 2024, received a 10-year prison sentence. She was tasked with tracking Ukrainian air defenses in Chernihiv Oblast under the guise of taxi rides, communicating with her GRU handler through an anonymous messenger chat.