Colombia’s Unfinished Business of Peace: De La Espriella and JEP

Ten years after Colombia signed its historic peace agreement with the FARC, the country's experiment with transitional justice is facing a critical juncture. The anniversary is marked not by a unanimous celebration, but by a clash over the future of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the tribunal tasked with investigating and judging the most severe crimes during the nation's internal conflict.

At the heart of the dispute lies not only money but also a deeper question: what does justice mean following decades of strife? President Abelardo De La Espriella has made it clear that he plans to challenge the JEP's role and cost while still respecting its constitutional standing. In his inauguration speech, he emphasized that Colombia could not accept a justice system that becomes "a mechanism of indulgence" for those responsible for the deaths of Colombians.

He also argued that the JEP was born from a process that failed to gain popular support. The original agreement was signed on September 26, 2016, in Cartagena, but six days later, Colombian voters narrowly rejected it in a nationwide plebiscite, with 50.21 percent voting against and 49.78 percent in favor. A revised agreement followed later in November.

De La Espriella's position has extended beyond the JEP's budget to address the painful legacy of child recruitment during the conflict. In a televised address, he vowed to protect children and adolescents exploited by criminal organizations, while also holding accountable those who use them for illicit activities. This stance adds a more stringent dimension to his critique of the transitional justice model.

While questioning the JEP's substantial demands on public funding, his administration is simultaneously presenting child protection and the direct pursuit of recruiters as a core responsibility of the state. This tension lies at the core of Colombia's unfinished peace business: reconciling restorative justice, accountability, and reparations for victims with a government committed to demonstrating that those exploiting civilians—especially children—will face the full force of the law.

The government has proposed a COP170 billion reduction in the 2027 budget for the transitional-justice system, including COP30 billion for operating expenditure and COP140 billion for investment. The JEP president, Alejandro Ramelli, has described this proposed transfer of resources as a form of financial "asphyxiation." The timing is particularly significant, as the JEP is now reaching a stage where senior former FARC commanders receive some punitive sanctions.

The restorative model was never intended to replicate ordinary criminal justice. Instead, it allows perpetrators to acknowledge responsibility and receive sanctions based on restricted liberty, truth-telling, and restorative work. This model is now being tested against the expectations of victims. For many Colombians who suffered kidnappings, forced displacement, disappearances, child recruitment, and other crimes, the central question is not merely whether a tribunal has established responsibility.

It is whether justice has produced tangible results: truth, acknowledgement, reparations, and restoration. This anniversary thus becomes particularly uncomfortable, as it underscores Colombia's ongoing struggle to balance the needs of victims and the demands of a transitional justice system.