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AI Safety Is a Zero Trust Problem, Not a Philosophy Debate

The reaction to Jacob Coxon leaving Anthropic centers on existential risk. That debate matters. But existential risk is not an infrastructure strategy. Frontier lab insiders discuss catastrophic AI risks. This conversation remains incomplete. Modern AI systems expose the limits of static IAM roles and traditional network perimeters. Agents delegate work. They invoke external tools. They spawn…

The departure of Jacob Coxon from Anthropic has sparked discussions around existential risk. However, this debate is not an infrastructure strategy. Experts from frontier labs discuss the catastrophic risks posed by modern AI systems. These systems expose the limitations of static IAM roles and traditional network perimeters. Agents can delegate tasks, invoke external tools, and spawn additional agents.

Terminating the initial runtime often fails to terminate these downstream processes. An agent can express an unauthorized objective through legitimate API calls, and static allowlists fail to validate the request fully. Zero Trust principles must be applied directly to the AI runtime. This involves implementing continuous dynamic risk scoring for every agent action, enforcing cryptographic validation of state at every network hop, deploying hard execution limits for compute, network, and tool access, demanding immutable runtime evidence over model self-reporting, and treating each agent as adversarial by default.

While model alignment addresses one problem, infrastructure security addresses another. An aligned model operating within an architecture with excessive permissions is insufficient; a misaligned model can function safely within secure infrastructure when its capabilities are constrained. This approach exemplifies defense in depth.

The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications highlights goal hijacking and tool misuse as critical security risks. The OWASP Agent Control Standard focuses on runtime enforcement. System safety cannot rely solely on model behavior; it necessitates rigid infrastructure boundaries. As the industry advances toward increasingly autonomous agents, designing runtimes that enforce strict boundaries becomes crucial. A compromised agent must never surpass these limits. Infrastructure first, philosophy second.

Written by urgent.news from Dev.to's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.

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Day 4 - LLM - Tool Calling

Tool Calling Asking some query to the LLM. LLM is like a phone book , it can't call on its own. With some tools only it will. Tools are nothing but FUNCTIONS.

  • Tool calling enables LLMs to interact with external tools like APIs and databases.
  • Langchain framework uses @tool decorator to mark methods callable by the LLM.
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I’m building **Cerbère-AG**, a security evidence layer for AI agents.

I’m building Cerbère-AG , a security evidence layer for AI agents. Most AI security tools focus on what goes into the model: prompt injection, malicious inputs, jailbreaks, etc.

  • Cerbère-AG is a security evidence layer for AI agents.
  • Focuses on actions AI models take, not just inputs.
  • Seeking feedback from developers running AI agents.

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