Iran stages show of force during mobilisation campaign in Tehran

In recent days, the Houthis have taken control of the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands in the southern Red Sea, intensifying their rapid advance that has resulted in their control of the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Earlier this month, their forces captured the crucial port city of Mocha, forcing out Saudi-linked Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) forces.

The group has also seized Perim Island, situated directly within the strait, and the Zuqar islands situated further north.The Iranian-backed Shia militants are currently positioned at the most narrow part of the coastline, just 20 km away from the African shoreline. This proximity affords them, and by extension the Iran-led regional alliance they belong to, effective control over maritime traffic traversing the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea.

In their advance statements, the Houthis have made it clear that they aim to target Saudi shipping in the strait, rather than enforce a comprehensive naval blockade. The Houthi advance was supported by an Iraqi Shia militia drone strike on the Saudi East-West pipeline on September 10. This pipeline had enabled Riyadh to transport oil to the Red Sea, circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, which is vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

The pipeline is expected to be offline for three to five weeks. Iran's allies are coordinating pressure across the Red Sea corridorThe coordinated actions between the Iraqi Shia militias and the Houthis are intended to bolster the Iran-led alliance's control over maritime traffic from Hormuz to the Red Sea. By focusing on Saudi Arabia - which initiated the current conflict with its attack on Sana'a airport in July - the strategy aims to avoid provoking US retaliation, which a broader effort to blockade Bab el-Mandeb might elicit.

The recent developments underscore the Iran-led regional bloc's ongoing capacity to collaborate for shared goals. Despite Israel's significant damage to Iran's allies in the Levant, Tehran and its allies remain actively engaged. It is important to note that while Israel has weakened Iran's allies in the Levant, Tehran and its allies remain active further south in the Gulf region.

The Houthis, like Hamas and unlike Lebanese or Iraqi Hezbollah, are not direct franchises or proxies of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Instead, they are authentic and deeply rooted local movements with their own objectives and preferences. For instance, the Houthis chose to avoid direct confrontation in the recent fighting before the Saudi attacks, now targeting Riyadh specifically.

This indicates that the organization is not merely an Iranian puppet, acting on Tehran's orders. However, this operational independence should not be overstated. The Houthis' impressive military capabilities are primarily supported by their relationship with Tehran. Close examination reveals that the Houthis' military activities are enabled by the direct presence of Iranian and other allied personnel in Yemen, and the active involvement of Iranian and allied Iraqi and Lebanese personnel who guide and manage the Houthis.

Documents obtained by The Jerusalem Post from Yemeni sources further reveal the Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese support for the Houthis. These documents list the names and identifying information of Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese experts in Yemen who provide technical advice and supervision to the Houthis regarding drones, missiles, and intelligence/security operations.

For example, the documents name Iranian citizen Haji Murtaza Mokhles and Iraqi Abu Mukhtar Bari Mashour, who offer guidance in intelligence and security operations. They work closely with Abu Jihad Muhammad Alawi al-Tiri, a senior Houthi official from Bayt Baws, located 8 km south of Sana'a. He serves as a senior official of the "Houthi Security and Intelligence Service," overseeing the Military Intelligence Center and the Presidential Information Center.

Similarly, in the field of drones, the documents reference Iranian citizen Hasan bin Hasan Danbous and Iraqi Hasan Iyad al-Ameri, both senior experts, as collaborating with senior Houthi commander Hassan Sharafi in developing this area. Regarding missiles, the documents identify Iraqi Muhammad Sayed al-Hakim and Iranian citizen Karar Mumammad al-Musawi as working with Abu Bashar Saleh al-Saree, who manages the central information department of the missile forces.

These examples represent a larger list. The documents contain details about the smuggling methods that enable the Houthis to bring essential components and equipment into Yemen, and the roles of Iran, Russia, and China. They name several businessmen residing in the Houthi-controlled part of Yemen, responsible for importing drone spare parts from China to Houthi-controlled Yemen.

These businessmen include Safwan al-Dabai, Yasser al-Dabai, and Rami al-Hajj al-Alimi, among others. According to the documents, following a meeting in Muscat, Oman, in March 2024 under Iranian auspices, several Chinese shipping companies began paying the Houthis in hard currency to ensure their ships could pass through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea without interference. The list of companies includes two major Chinese firms.