In the Iran war, a tale of old American dilemmas

In the Iran war, a tale of old American dilemmas, Japan in 1945 and Iran today are fundamentally different cases. Nor can the atomic bomb of 1945 simply be compared with today’s sophisticated nuclear arsenals. Yet, there is a common strategic problem: How does a great power turn military superiority into a political outcome? If Washington were pushed into a corner — by the cost of the conflict, the inability to compel Iran’s submission or pressure to demonstrate that American power can still deliver a decisive result — the temptation to consider previously unacceptable options could arise.

The decision-making process surrounding Truman was more complex than the familiar image of a President simply deciding whether to drop the bomb. The views of members of the administration, military leaders and the scientific community were all sought, and they were not identical. The principal US objective was to force Japan to surrender while avoiding the heavy American casualties that an invasion was expected to entail.

An atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. Japan did not immediately surrender. Three days later, Nagasaki was struck. Around the same time, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. The sequence matters. Even unprecedented destruction does not automatically translate into political capitulation. Japan’s surrender followed a combination of factors.

The decision also had consequences beyond Japan. Moscow was watching. At Potsdam, Truman informed Stalin that the US possessed a powerful new weapon. US officials understood that possession and use of the bomb could affect the emerging relationship with the Soviet Union.

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