Mobilization 2.0: Is it inevitable, and what can Putin actually achieve?
Rumors are spreading across Russia that a new wave of mobilization will begin sometime after the State Duma elections conclude on Sept. 20. There is no shortage of cause for such speculation: regions are holding mobilization exercises, employers are being reminded of their obligations regarding military registration of employees, and an electronic register of people who can legally be called up…
The debate over the new Russian mobilization centers around the question of whether the Russian army truly lacks manpower. Various calculations yield differing estimates of potential new soldiers and their impact on the armed forces. Using federal budget expenditures for enlistment bonuses, IStories estimates 71,200 recruits in Q1 2026 and 60,100 in Q2 2026, totaling 131,300 over six months, or about 720 daily.
This is nearly identical to the 127,500 in the first half of 2025, but roughly 20% below the 2024 figure. However, economist Janis Kluge predicts higher numbers: 79,000 new contract soldiers in Q1 2026 and 93,000 in Q2, or around 172,000 in six months, close to 1,000 daily in Q2. Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev suggests over 200,000 contracts in the first half of 2026.
The discrepancy between official figures and budget-based estimates has been seen before, but it's prudent to use a range of 700–1,000 new contract soldiers daily, or 20,000–30,000 monthly. Kluge's September calculations confirm this, with 234,000 contracts signed by August 2026, compared to 260,000 in the same period in 2025. The recruitment rate remains around 1,000 daily, below the 34,000 needed monthly by regional authorities.
While the current pace of recruitment may not sustain the growth seen in the early war years, it's unclear if the force is truly stagnating.
Written by urgent.news from The Insider's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
