The US sells more to Brazil than it buys – but Trump is slapping steep tariffs on its exports anyway

Throughout 2025, American firms exported roughly $54 billion in goods to Brazil, primarily comprising refined fuel, airplane components, industrial machinery, fertilizer, and electronics. Conversely, their imports from Brazil amounted to around $40 billion, mainly consisting of crude oil, semi-finished steel, coffee, orange juice, wood pulp, beef, and aircraft manufactured by Embraer, the globe's third-largest aircraft producer. Consequently, the United States achieved a $14 billion trade surplus with Brazil during that year.

Despite this surplus, President Donald Trump imposed a 25% tariff on Brazilian goods on July 15, 2026, followed by an additional 12.5 percentage points in the subsequent week, taking effect on July 24, thus elevating the cumulative tariff rate to 37.5% upon overlapping. The trade deficit reversed in this scenario, with U.S. exports to Brazil surpassing its imports for several years.

In 2025, American enterprises exported approximately $54 billion worth of goods to Brazil, consisting primarily of refined fuel, airplane parts, industrial machinery, fertilizer, and electronics. In return, they procured around $40 billion in Brazilian commodities, predominantly crude oil, semi-finished steel, coffee, orange juice, wood pulp, beef, and passenger jets crafted by Embraer, the world's third-largest aircraft manufacturer. In aggregate, the United States attained a $14 billion trade surplus with Brazil.

Trump is also aiming to discourage Brazilian imports. Notably, this approach marked his second endeavor to achieve this objective. In 2025, he had initially proposed a 50% tariff on Brazilian goods, which was subsequently overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in February 2026, alongside most of his other tariffs. As scholars specializing in international political economy who scrutinize U.S. trade policy and Brazil's trade negotiations, we sought to comprehend why the U.S. imposed tariffs on Brazil, given its trade deficit with the U.S., and how Brazil responded to this situation.

Our perspective is that the dispute with Brazil was not primarily centered around trade. Instead, it originated from Trump's objections to a criminal case against former President Jair Bolsonaro, a key political ally of Trump in Brazil. At present, with Brazil gearing up for a presidential election, countering Washington could prove to be a compelling argument for the incumbent President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Consequently, the administration exempted 471 Brazilian products from the tariffs, including coffee, wood and wood products, crude oil, natural gas, fertilizer, orange juice, and pig iron. The majority of these exempted goods are commodities and industrial inputs that American buyers would find challenging to replace swiftly. Conversely, the majority of the products that remained subject to tariffs are manufactured items, such as shoes, clothing, furniture, machinery, and ethanol, a motor fuel derived from sugarcane.

Brazilian footwear and apparel, which compete on price in American markets, did not receive any exemption.

Although discussions have hit a deadlock, formal meetings are scheduled for September 30, just prior to Brazil's presidential election, at a Group of 20 trade meeting in Wisconsin. The U.S. has granted certain exceptions for Brazilian exports, such as coffee, due to the difficulty in finding suitable substitutes. Over 94 billion dollars' worth of goods exchanged hands between the two nations in 2025, a figure that significantly trailed the volume of U.S. trade with Canada, Mexico, China, or the European Union.

However, Brazil ranks among the 17 largest trading partners of the United States based on goods flow, ahead of Spain, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. The goods currently facing tariffs are mainly industrial inputs rather than ready-to-consume products. Thus, the financial impact of Trump's tariffs primarily falls on U.S. companies, as they bear the costs when goods arrive at the border.

The efficacy of Trump's tariff policy in persuading Brazil to alter its policies aligns with his administration's objectives is constrained, given that Washington's leverage over Brazil in trade matters has been dwindling for years. Since 2009, China has emerged as Brazil's largest trading partner, overtaking the United States, who secured an 11% share of Brazil's exports in 2025.

This decline in Brazil's dependence on the U.S. market diminishes the potential influence of Trump's tariffs. This fact elucidates why, when Washington imposed tariffs on imports from across the globe in 2025, Brazilian exporters were able to readily sell their wares in other markets. The pressure on Brazil may prove counterproductive, as accusing 40 nations, including Brazil, of facilitating China's circumvention of U.S. tariffs, the White House advised by Peter Navarro and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, might lead Brazilians to seek out China as a more viable buyer for their exports.