The geopolitics of scarcity: Why middle powers must learn to prioritise
When Keir Starmer recently argued that Britain must rebuild its hard power, much of the discussion focused on defence spending. That is understandable. After years of underinvestment, Britain faces difficult choices about military capability at a time of growing geopolitical instability. But money is only part of the challenge. Britain’s more fundamental foreign policy problem […] The post The…
Keir Starmer recently argued that Britain must rebuild its hard power, but the focus on defence spending may be misplaced. The fundamental issue is deciding where to allocate geopolitical influence, a scarce resource shared by many developed nations. In the past, Western countries operated under the assumption of strategic abundance, but that is no longer the case.
Years of underinvestment, government reforms, Brexit disruptions, and the hollowing out of diplomatic capacity have reduced Britain's ability to shape events abroad. While strengthening the military and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office are necessary, they cannot recreate the geopolitical environment that once amplified Britain's influence.
Similarly, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan are all grappling with this dilemma. The United States remains significant, but its unpredictability poses a challenge. China, on the other hand, is both an essential economic partner and a strategic competitor. As geopolitical influence becomes scarcer, governments may need to adopt a more disciplined approach, investing where it yields the greatest returns.
Government must decide which relationships, institutions, and issues align with their interests, and which are merely desirable. Successful statecraft now demands strategic discipline over diplomatic ubiquity. Countries like India and emerging powers may have their own priorities that don't align with preserving the post-war Western order.
However, cooperation is still crucial, but Western governments must be realistic about where they can generate meaningful leverage. The paradox is that as Western influence wanes, successful middle powers might need to cooperate more closely with one another rather than less. For Britain, this means shifting from a strategy of "Global Britain" to one of strategic concentration.
Engaging in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and strengthening ties with ASEAN and Singapore are examples of this approach. These partnerships acknowledge that Britain's future influence will depend on a smaller number of capable, trusted allies, rather than an attempt to maintain equal weight everywhere.
Written by urgent.news from e27's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
