Ukraine Can Grow the Grain. The Question Is Whether the World Can Get It

Ukraine possesses the capacity to increase grain exports, but the central question lies in whether the international community can successfully facilitate this process. In August 2026, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price Index reached a record high of 133.3 points, primarily due to uncertainty regarding grain exports from the Black Sea.

This situation arises because the price of bread in countries like Cairo, Algiers, and Jakarta remains contingent upon whether a bulk carrier can safely enter a Ukrainian port. Russian military actions have intensified over the summer of 2026, targeting port infrastructure, vessels in ports, and maritime routes since July 1. In July, 169 vessels docked at Odesa ports, but this number plummeted to just 7 by the first eleven days of August.

The last port call occurred on July 22 since the corridor was established. Insurers have ceased issuing new war-risk policies, making voyages legally possible but economically unfeasible. The waters themselves are not mined, and the corridor remains accessible, but these actions do not constitute a traditional naval blockade. Russia's missile strikes and terminal attacks create similar practical effects without adhering to the legal obligations associated with a blockade.

The Ukrainian agricultural sector is projected to yield 60 million tons of grain, with a combined grain and oilseed output ranging from 83 to 85 million tons, far surpassing domestic consumption. The major challenges stem from missile strikes rather than agricultural production. The situation contrasts with 2022, where supply losses from one side of the Black Sea led to market redistribution, but now both key suppliers face constraints simultaneously, resulting in a genuine reduction in total supply.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative from 2022 serves as a successful precedent, with Ukraine exporting nearly 33 million tons of food to 45 countries across three continents over 1,000 voyages, benefiting nations like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. However, Russia's unilateral withdrawal from the initiative led to its collapse.

Kyiv has shown willingness for a mutual moratorium on strikes against civilian vessels and ports, but Russia has consistently rejected such proposals. The Russian Foreign Ministry initially dismissed half-measures to ease pressure on Ukraine, and President Zelensky claims Putin rejected a truce proposal entirely. It is crucial to distinguish between Ukraine's targeting of military infrastructure and Russian strikes on vessels carrying grain and storage facilities, both of which violate the prohibition on using starvation as a warfare method outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2417 of 2018.

Countries purchasing Ukrainian food, such as Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, India, Turkey, and EU states, have a vested interest in pressing Russia for a resolution. The EU could establish a state-backed mechanism providing war risk insurance for vessels destined for Ukrainian ports, independent of Russia's consent, which would make insurance more affordable.

Additionally, naval escorts for grain convoys from neutral Black Sea states, potentially involving food-importing nations, have been suggested. Ukraine has demonstrated its responsibility in supplying global food markets, exporting 33 million tons during wartime, and remains prepared to continue this role. The persistent attacks on merchant shipping, in both the Black Sea and Red Sea, challenge the notion of the sea being safe for trade, and a grain truce is essential to maintain this safety.