Mahu kurang perbicaraan rasuah? Pastikan rekod kerajaan tak boleh dimanipulasi

"Say I cannot." With only those words, a golf club safety manager highlighted a problem echoing through Malaysian courts, tender processes and audits. On 1 September, during the Mahathir Muhyiddin corruption case, Tropicana Golf & Country Resort's safety manager Saravanan testified that Muhyiddin played golf with businessman Azman Yusoff on 19 July 2020.

However, when pressed to verify the information's accuracy, Saravanan merely replied, "I cannot." Doubt began to surround the reliability of the data when legal counsel suggested it could be altered. The verifiability of such records became questionable, not due to evidence of alteration, but because no one could prove otherwise.

This issue was not limited to a single case. On August 27, three former Malaysian prime ministers — Najib Razak, Muhyiddin Yassin, and Ismail Sabri Yaakob — appeared simultaneously in the Kuala Lumpur High Court complex for separate hearings. Najib faced a USD5.64 billion ($22.8 billion) civil lawsuit filed by the 1MDB scandal. Muhyiddin's trial continued amid a charge of RM225.3 million corruption against Bersatu, which he denied.

Ismail Sabri admitted to no guilt in charges of failing to declare assets to Malaysia's Anti-Corruption Agency (SPRM). Courts will determine each case based on facts and evidence presented. However, cases like these heavily depend on records — bank statements, acquisition documents, approval records, and ledgers. A primary question for defense lawyers is: how can we be sure the records haven't been altered?

This is a reasonable inquiry. Almost all Malaysian government records, from loan assessments in the Finance Ministry's eProcurement system to departmental expenditure files, are stored in regular data warehouses. The problem is that regular data warehouses can be altered by anyone with administrative access. In other words, the system managers also have the ability to change historical records stored within them.

This is where blockchain technology can play a role. It's not the blockchain commonly associated with cryptocurrency trading and speculative gains, which often raises skepticism. Instead, it can be used in a more practical way — as a digital record that cannot be easily rewritten, including by the government itself. The process is simple.

Every time a record is created — such as when a bid is submitted, evaluation scores are entered, or contract award signatures are added — a cryptographic 'hash' is generated. This unique digital fingerprint is then published to the blockchain. The original record remains unchanged; only the hash is openly broadcast. If someone later alters the original record, even a comma, the digital fingerprint will no longer match.

While this technology does not prevent records from being altered outright, any changes would be immediately detectable, with evidence of the change preserved. However, we must also clarify the limits of this technology. Blockchain cannot determine if information is true when it is first entered. If 15 incorrect names were added from the start, the blockchain would only ensure those 15 names remained the original record.

It cannot prevent cash-based fraud in attachments or direct phone orders not recorded in the system. However, blockchain can mitigate many forms of manipulation, such as changing document dates, making silent edits, deleting files, or altering evaluation outcomes. In short, it can reduce the effort needed to correct errors. In court, this technology can also change the nature of questions.

Instead of asking, "Can this record be trusted?" the court only needs to determine if the record has ever been altered since it was created. This can be answered through mathematical proof. This is not mere theory. Estonia was the first country to use blockchain directly in government systems in 2012. Today, it is used to protect records like land registers, business registries, government documents, and millions of health records.

The World Economic Forum and the Inter-American Development Bank have also tested blockchain-based procurement systems for a school meal program in Colombia. The system includes an automatic mechanism to detect suspicious tenders. Malaysia does not need to build this infrastructure from scratch. The Malaysia Blockchain Infrastructure, developed by the national research agency MIMOS Berhad in collaboration with MY EG Services and using the Zetrix network, has been operational since April 2025.

What is still missing is clear guidance to encourage widespread use. Three steps can be taken. First, safeguard the government procurement process. The Finance Ministry must require eProcurement to generate and record a cryptographic hash for every stage of a tender, including bid submission, evaluation scores, and contract award signatures, as soon as each process is completed.

Azam Baki, as the last head of the Anti-Corruption Agency, estimated RM277 billion ($62 billion) in corruption and misuse of public funds over six years. He also warned that anti-corruption efforts cannot be abandoned, as the problem remains serious and systemic in some sectors. Second, directly involve the National Audit Department.

It needs to be given access to all stages of government procurement. Third, clearly communicate the benefits of this technology to the public and the government.