ISIS surveillance of top Malaysian policemen: A massive red light on persistent extremism

Former top Malaysian policeman Ayob Khan revealed that Islamic State operatives were tracking his movements, including his jogging routine, which should raise concerns across the country. As a former head of Bukit Aman's Counter-Terrorism Division and later Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Khan was a high-profile target. Militants in Indonesia and regional cells had circulated online directives to "finish off" Khan, who had dismantled recruitment networks and thwarted plot attempts.

This monitoring of senior officers is a sign of ISIS's remaining strength and support networks in Malaysia.

Malaysia has a long history of involvement in jihadist activity. During the height of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), about 200 local members were estimated to be part of the group. Malaysian operatives held key roles in technical and leadership positions, with individuals like Dr Azahari Husin, responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, and Noordin Mohammad Top, behind high-profile attacks in various locations, providing a template for future threats.

Malaysians have traveled to Syria and Iraq in significant numbers, with official figures around 100-200, though the true figure may be higher.

Although the Malaysian government claims to have thwarted 26 militant plots and detained many Salafi-jihadist suspects between 2012 and 2024, two attacks still occurred during this period: the 2016 Movida nightclub bombing and the 2024 Ulu Tiram police station attack, which killed two officers. The environment that fosters these networks remains largely unaddressed in public discourse.

Certain religious schools and tahfiz centers have been flagged, most recently the Dar Al Quran Wa Hadeeth centre in Perlis, which was raided and suspended for spreading Salafi-jihadist ideology in 2018. The government's relative silence on this broader ideological pipeline contrasts with the intense monitoring efforts by Special Branch, which underscores the scale of the problem.

Singapore's Internal Security Department has been more transparent about radicalisation cases under the ISA, with over 100 individuals dealt with since 2001, and 54 cases handled between 2015 and 2021. The majority of these cases involved self-radicalisation, raising alarms about online radicalisation pathways. In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of younger perpetrators, including several 14-year-olds detained for attack planning and detailed ideological beliefs.

Singapore openly names the problem, details the pathways, and reports rehabilitation outcomes, fostering public understanding and societal resilience. Malaysia, however, remains largely opaque, with selective announcements of foiled plots. The regional context adds to the concern, with ISIS elements seeking footholds in southern Thailand via Malaysia.

The online environments that radicalise young people in countries like Singapore are freely accessible across the peninsula, with recruitment shifting from physical usrah circles to encrypted apps, gaming platforms, and social media, lowering the barrier for lone actors and small cells. Ayob Khan's admission of being watched while jogging is more than a personal security issue; it signifies that networks retain the capability to identify high-value targets, task local supporters for surveillance, and maintain operational security to operate within Malaysia.

This revelation, combined with the historical record of Malay extremist activity, highlights the persistent threat posed by ISIS and similar groups in Malaysia.