Melayu, Islam dan politik identiti: Di mana batasnya?

The issue of identity politics in Malaysia is not new. It is not a modern invention of democracy, and it is not a phenomenon exclusive to Malaysian politics. As societies become divided along lines of ethnicity, ancestry, religion, region, or social group, identity almost inevitably becomes part of political competition. Interestingly, Islamic history provides us with a paradox.

Prophet Muhammad preached strongly against favoring humanity based on ancestry and race. Yet, after his death, Islam's political affairs faced challenges involving Arabs and non-Arabs, descendants of the Prophet, clans, and dynastic legitimacy. This highlights the importance of distinguishing between Islam as a doctrine and politics as human activity.

The Quran in Surah al-Hujurat 13 acknowledges that humans are created from diverse ethnicities and clans, encouraging mutual recognition. The same verse sets the standard of greatness on piety, not ethnicity or ancestry. In the Prophet's last sermon, he reiterated that Arabs do not have superiority over non-Arabs, and non-Arabs do not have superiority over Arabs, except based on piety.

Prophet Muhammad himself was Arab, living in an Arab society and valuing family, clan, and cultural connections. However, he placed the measure of greatness beyond lineage in virtues. Islam does not reject identity; it rejects the arrogance of identity. The concept of asabiyyah becomes crucial in understanding this. Ibn Khaldun, centuries later, described asabiyyah as group solidarity that can become a source of political power.

In certain forms, it can help build solidarity. However, when group loyalty overpowers justice, it can become a cause of division and conflict. Islamic political history offers many examples of this tension. The Umayyad dynasty had strong Arab and clan dimensions. When Islam's territory expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula, the issue of Muslim status for non-Arabs or non-mawali became part of social and political problems, contributing to Umayyad governance tensions.

The Abbasids built part of their legitimacy through connections with Banu Hashim and the Prophet's family. Their movement also received support from groups dissatisfied with the Umayyad political structure, including non-Arab societies. The Fatimids later built their political legitimacy claim through ancestry ties to Fatimah bint Muhammad and Ali ibn Abi Talib.

This history cannot be simplified as simply a dynasty using identity politics. Economic factors, defense, governance, theology, and power struggles all play roles. However, one enduring lesson remains clear: religious, ethnic, and lineage identities can become a legitimate political basis when humans use them to answer questions of who has the right to lead.

Malaysia's context is vastly different, but the fundamental question remains relevant. Malaysia was formed through a complex history: Malay kingdoms, Islam, British colonization, migration, colonial economic development, independence struggles, and political negotiations among communities. Therefore, identity politics cannot be understood merely as a political game.

To some extent, it is embedded in history and the state's structure. In this context, Article 153 of the Constitution is non-negotiable. Article 153 assigns the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's responsibility to protect the special position of the Malay and the people of Sabah and Sarawak, alongside the interests of other groups. This includes matters like public services, scholarships, or education advantages and permits or licenses as stipulated by the Constitution.

Thus, safeguarding Malay and Bumiputra status is not inherently a negative identity politics approach. It has historical and constitutional bases. Similarly, advocating for the interests of other communities should not be seen as anti-Malay action. Problems arise when Article 153 is read as a political slogan, and one of its two aspects (Malay and Bumiputra special status and the welfare of other groups) is sidelined from the narrative.

This is where Malaysia's identity politics becomes increasingly complex. Some politicians use threatening Malay language to solidify support. Others view almost all forms of Bumiputra protection as inherently unfair. Article 153 cannot become a license to consider Malays always right, nor can it be treated as a historical mistake that can be erased through political rhetoric.

What needs to be assessed is its implementation and outcomes. This leads us to a more substantive question about Bumiputera foundations. After 1969, the New Economic Policy introduced two main objectives: eradicating poverty regardless of ethnicity and restructuring society so ethnic identification no longer primarily defined social functions.

After more than five decades, we have the right to question academically whether all instruments used still achieve their original goals. This is not a question of whether Malays should be helped. The question is how such assistance can result in social mobility, quality education, ownership of assets, entrepreneurship, and lasting competitiveness.

If one foundation helps a poor Malay family escape poverty, it achieves an important social goal. However, if the benefits of a particular foundation are repeatedly focused on groups already possessing wealth, networks, or political access, we must have the courage to repair its mechanisms. Criticizing implementation based on data does not mean rejecting the principle; it means preserving it from misuse. This is where Malaysian politics must move from protection politics to meritocracy politics.