박정희 때로 돌아간 ‘개발주의’ 산업정책 [왜냐면]

The development-oriented industrial policy of the Park Chung-hee government is a period not to be overlooked, particularly the years of 1976 and 1977. Following the full-scale growth of South Korea's heavy industry in the latter half of the 1970s, the construction of the Pohang Iron and Steel Complex, which began in 1973, expanded its capacity from 103,000t to 260,000t with its second equipment installation in 1976 and aimed to further increase it to 700,000t by 1979.

The construction of the Changwon Industrial Complex, established in 1974, led to the establishment of modern day Samsung C&T Corporation. In 1977, the world's largest single factory under the standard of single factory in South Korea, the Noryangjin Chemical 7 Fertilizer Plant, was inaugurated in Yongin, Gyeonggi Province, and in the same year, South Korea achieved its first export of $100 billion, marking the end of Park Chung-hee's final economic development plan, the 'Fourth Economic Development Five-Year Plan'.

The establishment of the country's first nuclear power plant, Unit 1 of Godong 1, in 1977 also marked this period. As heavy industry continued to expand, energy consumption and demand surged. The domestic electricity generation, only 9.2 TWh in 1970, increased five years later to 19.8 TWh, and doubled to 26.6 TWh in 1977, a 34.3% jump in just two years.

To support the rapidly increasing electricity demand, the government separated the energy and power department within the Ministry of Finance, establishing the 'Power Resource Agency', and constructing a control tower to manage oil, coal, and power supply. The Power Resource Agency, which began operations in 1978, aimed to expedite the licensing and land acquisition process for power plants and transmission facilities, and enacted the Power Development Special Law in that year.

Looking back 50 years later, the current landscape mirrors the historical context of the 1970s. The 'Three Major Projects' plan proposed by the government and the implementation of the 'National Electricity Grid Special Law' and 'Major Special Zone Special Law' to cope with the surging electricity demand are reminiscent of the development-oriented and supply-dominant state industrial policy of the late 1970s.

Recently, the Ministry of Climate and Environment reported that by 2040, the power demand for the Three Major Projects would be around 27GW, more than the total capacity of all nuclear power plants (26GW) currently operating in South Korea. To meet this massive demand in a short period, expanding renewable energy, increasing dependence on liquefied natural gas (LNG), and delaying the de-commissioning of aging nuclear power plants are inevitable.

The public-sector agency that voiced concerns about excessive power demand expansion and its impact on greenhouse gas emissions, the Ministry of Climate and Environment, was criticized by environmental organizations for its limited influence. However, the Ministry of Climate and Environment has been playing a minimal restraining role through environmental impact assessments and climate change impact assessments.

Today, the Ministry of Climate and Environment's role resembles that of the 'Power Resource Agency', with the government's top leader even mentioning the need for environmental impact assessments, which the Ministry of Climate and Environment has yet to address or challenge. In the era of climate crisis, the core objective of the Ministry of Climate and Environment should not be limited to ensuring stable power supply.

It is crucial to question whether the current power demand is truly necessary for our society and how much it can sustain within the limits of climate goals and ecological boundaries. The question to ask in a climate crisis is whether the 'Ministry of Climate and Environment' should be reduced to 'Power Resource Agency'.