Can ODM and UDA share govt without agreeing to share the ballot?

A forged agreement suggesting ODM and UDA have divided key government roles across Kenya’s Coast region has exposed a fundamental disagreement in their negotiations for the 2027 election: the possibility of sharing power without sharing the ballot. On September 1, 2026, ODM categorically rejected a circulating document claiming their parties had agreed on a distribution of governor, senator, and woman representative positions throughout the Coast’s six counties.

The document implied ODM would secure the governorships in Mombasa and Kilifi while UDA would take the positions in Kwale, Tana River, Lamu, and Taita Taveta. Despite ODM’s insistence that this is "FAKE News," the underlying political question is very much real.

The core issue at hand is whether ODM and UDA can agree to share government responsibilities without also agreeing to share the electoral competition for those roles among their supporters. This question gains increasing relevance as the two parties strive for a possible political arrangement for the upcoming General Election. ODM has been advocating for a 50:50 power-sharing formula in talks with President William Ruto’s UDA.

National Chairperson Gladys Wanga emphasized that ODM would enter negotiations as an equal partner, pushing for parity in government positions and the presidential ticket. "We have entered into talks with our colleagues, and I want to declare here that we are the biggest party in the region. When we enter into talks, we will enter as equal partners," she declared in April.

"And when seats are put on the table, it will be 50-50. If they produce a president, we will produce a deputy president."

This demand adds a second layer to the coalition talks, as ODM is not only negotiating government roles but also an electoral understanding to prevent undermining each other in strongly contested areas. Such an arrangement would involve zoning, where coalition partners agree not to field competing candidates in selected regions where one party has a strong political presence.

ODM has sought this understanding in areas it regards as its strongholds, including the Coast, while UDA advocates for the freedom to field candidates nationwide.

The UDA’s position directly contradicts ODM’s zoning proposal. UDA Secretary-General Hassan Omar, who is vying for the Mombasa governorship, is among the most vocal opponents of ODM’s zoning demand. Omar argued that the Coast belongs to the people of the Coast, and they should compete fairly for the available positions. UDA’s stance remains evident in Mombasa, where Omar continues to signal his intention to contest, despite the zoning debate.

The disagreement fundamentally challenges the nature of a pre-election coalition. If UDA supports ODM’s presidential candidate or enters a formal alliance with ODM, does that necessitate UDA withdrawing candidates from areas ODM considers critical? Conversely, if ODM secures a 50:50 share of government, does that parity extend to nominations and elective positions?

Neither of these questions has been conclusively resolved. The Coast region provides a practical test, as its six counties exhibit distinct political dynamics, meaning that a presidential agreement would not automatically settle competition for governorships, senators, MPs, or county assembly seats.

The circulating forged agreement presented detailed allocations but ODM's rejection indicates it is not a genuine negotiated deal. Instead, the episode highlights the speculation surrounding ongoing talks and the political pressure on both parties to clarify how their cooperation will function at the polls. For ODM, zoning serves to safeguard politicians and supporters who fear losing ground to UDA candidates in traditionally strongholds.

For UDA, accepting such restrictions could limit its ambition to establish itself as a national party and frustrate aspirants who have already begun preparing for the 2027 contests.

Thus, the stakes are split between ODM, which seeks assurances that political cooperation will not erode its electoral base, and UDA, which seeks room to expand its base. While the parties have expressed interest in deeper cooperation, including a joint manifesto and framework for political engagement ahead of 2027, agreeing on policy may be easier than agreeing on candidates.

The zoning dispute may prove more significant than the headline declarations of political cooperation. The question is not only whether ODM and UDA can collaborate in government but also whether they can convince their politicians to accept limits on where they can compete, and persuade voters that an alliance remains meaningful when its members continue to vie for the same positions. The fake Coast agreement has merely highlighted this issue, rather than resolved it.