East Africa: From Red Sea to Sudan - Why Ethiopia's Instability Risks Destabilizing Horn of Africa

Addis Abeba — While the intensity of Ethiopia's conflict in 2020-2022 has decreased, the warning signals are becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss. Tigray is once again amid a tense political and military standoff, with unresolved issues from the Pretoria peace deal continuing to escalate. Recent skirmishes and indications of military buildup near Tigray have reignited concerns over a potential return to full-scale warfare.

The threat extends beyond Tigray. Ethiopia is currently dealing with armed conflicts and political turmoil in multiple regions, while instability in Sudan, strained relations with Eritrea, and heightened competition over the Red Sea have contributed to a volatile regional atmosphere. Addis Ababa tourismDiscover morePolitical commentary forumnewsStream History Documentaries The central question is no longer whether Ethiopia can endure another war.

The real question is whether its political leaders and international allies are prepared to intervene before a conflict becomes uncontrollable. The unfinished peace settlement and the resurgence of political tensions are the primary concerns. The November 2022 cessation of hostilities agreement was a significant milestone, but it fell short of a comprehensive political resolution.

The agreement merely required a cessation of hostilities, not a thorough political settlement. It necessitated addressing contested political and constitutional issues, facilitating the return of displaced persons, restoring institutions, and managing Ethiopia's political crisis through dialogue instead of force. Many of these tasks remain uncompleted.

The failure to resolve the status of Western Tigray exemplifies this issue. Human Rights Watch reported in April 2026 that authorities and security forces in Western Tigray persist in subjecting Tigrayans to arbitrary detention, movement restrictions, employment limitations, and other abuses. Over 740,000 people displaced from Western Tigray remain unable to return safely, a situation that is not merely humanitarian but also political and constitutional, creating a continuous incentive for conflict.

The crisis has been exacerbated by the breakdown of political trust between Addis Ababa and Tigray's leadership. In May, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) announced the restoration of the pre-war regional government, reinstating its legislative council and Debretsion Gebremichael as regional president. This move directly challenged the post-Pretoria political arrangement and intensified the dispute over governance in Tigray.

The federal government and Tigrayan leadership have provided conflicting interpretations of the peace agreement and the political system to follow it. This situation underscores why the crisis cannot be resolved through military intervention. When political disagreements are framed as military strength issues, every concession becomes a defeat, every compromise a threat, and every political dispute a potential spark for war.

That is how peace processes unravel. From ceasefire support to peace enforcement, the international community played a crucial role in ending the war in Tigray. The African Union, with the assistance of regional and international partners, facilitated the Pretoria agreement. However, the same level of commitment did not persist during implementation.

The European Union recently cautioned that developments in Tigray could undermine the Pretoria agreement, urging immediate de-escalation and political dialogue. Such statements are valuable, but they are insufficient to prevent another war. International actors must shift from crisis response to conflict prevention. They should establish a continuous mechanism involving the Ethiopian federal government, Tigray's political representatives, and other pertinent stakeholders.

The objective should not be to favor one side or penalize any party. Instead, it should be to develop a political process capable of addressing disputes that military force cannot settle. The international community should also advocate for independent monitoring of human rights and civilian protection in contested regions, especially Western Tigray.

Accountability should not be an afterthought in peace efforts. A peace agreement without accountability generates incentives for future abuses. A peace agreement without implementation encourages renewed conflict. International partners must also consider how financial and diplomatic support to Ethiopia should be tied. Development aid, humanitarian assistance, and institutional stability are crucial, but they should not become indirect subsidies for policies that exacerbate conflict or violate human rights.

This does not imply neglecting the Ethiopian population. On the contrary, humanitarian aid should continue to be provided where civilians require it most. However, governments offering financial assistance to Ethiopia should also demand tangible progress on human rights, political dialogue, civilian protection, and the execution of peace commitments.

Supporting the Ethiopian people and holding the Ethiopian government accountable are not mutually exclusive goals. In fact, they are interdependent.