The FBI’s Bin Laden Unit Had an ‘Oh, S***’ Moment, 3 Weeks Before 9/11
The FBI and CIA's fatal mistake—confusing Khalid al-Mihdhar, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and "Khallad"—allowed KSM to escape attention.
On August 21, 2001, FBI analyst Margaret Gillespie, assigned to the CIA Counterterrorist Center, prepared research on the USS Cole attack. She came across a 15-month-old cable from Bangkok reporting Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi's travel from Thailand to the United States on January 15, 2000. Gillespie inquired with U.S. Customs about the two's status, discovering they had intentions to stay in the U.S. The following day, Gillespie informed Dina Corsi, an FBI Bin Laden unit analyst, who promptly added al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to the terrorist watchlist.
Corsi's supervisor, Rodney Middleton, expressed shock, stating it was an "Oh, s***" moment. The team assigned to locate al-Mihdhar, the I-49 squad in New York, was deemed to have treated the matter casually. The Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after 9/11 found the CTC had ignored the March cable due to its labeled "information only" status.
The inquiry revealed that despite 150 individuals on the watchlist in March 2000, no one noticed the cable. The CIA also admitted to confusing al-Mihdhar with other individuals, ultimately failing to identify Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the mastermind behind 9/11.
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