Kuchma names three fatal mistakes in Ukraine's years of independence

Former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has highlighted three critical errors that shaped Ukraine's trajectory since gaining independence. First, Kuchma laments the decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in Vilnius, deeming it a major misstep. Emotionally, the most difficult aspect for him to accept is the de facto cession of Crimea in February-March 2014, when "little green men" stealthily took control of the peninsula.

Kuchma argues that a firm response to these provocations could have prevented Russia's attempted annexation. He also regrets Ukraine's decision to relinquish its nuclear arsenal in 1992. By signing the Budapest Memorandum that year, Ukraine essentially ceded control over 3,000 tactical nuclear warheads, which could have served as a deterrent against Russian aggression at the time. These warheads comprised various tactical weapons, such as aviation bombs, artillery shells, and naval torpedoes.

The Budapest Memorandum essentially stripped Ukraine of its strategic nuclear capability, which was already deemed obsolete for providing deterrence. However, Ukraine retained about 2,500 tactical warheads, which it could have deployed effectively under its own control. This loss of tactical nuclear weapons coincided with the establishment of the Soviet Union's strategic deterrent, rendering Ukraine's arsenal largely redundant.

Finally, Kuchma underscores the catastrophic withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory to Russia in 1992. By 1994, when the Budapest Memorandum was signed, Ukraine's strategic security concerns were largely addressed. Yet, Ukraine had initially possessed a comprehensive range of tactical nuclear weapons. If these had been retained and deployed, they might have deterred Russian aggression, potentially averting the annexation of Crimea in 2014.