What happens when the West runs out of interceptor missiles

Residents of Kyiv are facing life in overcrowded metro stations or cars in underground garages, as the air war escalates with Russia bombarding the city using an increasing number of ballistic and hypersonic missiles. Ukraine, which previously used Patriot anti-missile batteries to fend off such attacks, is now experiencing a shortage of ammunition, a state referred to as "going Winchester" in military jargon.

This predicament highlights the broader shortage of interceptors in the West and serves as a stark reminder of the global scarcity of such defensive systems.

The United States' dwindling arsenal is a significant contributing factor, which may have prompted President Donald Trump's recent retreat from threats to attack Iran. Allies such as Switzerland are already feeling the impact, with their order of Patriots now delayed by up to seven years. Taiwan, meanwhile, is concerned that the interceptors it ordered years ago might not arrive this year as planned.

Even major arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin is unable to guarantee delivery times to foreign clients, as the Pentagon has the power to divert these systems as it sees fit.

Historically, shortages of munitions are not uncommon in warfare, particularly in large-scale, attritional conflicts. However, the current shortage is particularly alarming, given the fact that America has only run short after a brief war against a medium-sized power. A recent study by the Heritage Foundation, a think-tank in Washington, suggests that America would exhaust its interceptors within days if it were to engage in a conflict with a powerful nation like China.

This is primarily due to the rapid use of interceptors by the United States and its allies during the war with Iran.

The root cause of this crisis lies in the disproportionate use of interceptors by the United States and its Middle Eastern allies during the conflict with Iran. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think-tank in Washington, the Pentagon has fired nearly two-thirds of its pre-war stock of Patriots and a significant proportion of other interceptors.

However, this situation is not entirely new; it is merely an acceleration of a problem that has been brewing for decades. Both American and European defence industries operate on peacetime schedules, despite the constant threat of war. Moreover, defense industries have been allocating more resources to developing flashy new weapons than to the much-needed munitions required to operate these systems.

Additionally, the global proliferation of missiles and a general complacency about American military supremacy in the air have all contributed to this problem.

The CSIS believes that it will take until 2029 to replenish Patriot stocks to pre-war levels, assuming that Congress approves President Trump's proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget, which would represent a 50% increase in current spending. However, given the likelihood of this request being rejected, the situation is unlikely to improve in the near future.

Despite the high cost of interceptors (PAC-3 MSE rounds cost between $4 million and $5 million each), ballistic missiles are generally less expensive, making this a costly and inefficient exchange. In addition, a single interceptor is often used to target multiple incoming missiles, further exacerbating the issue.

Ukraine's defense strategy has been to layer their defenses, utilizing a world-class network to counter swarms of Russian drones, effectively neutralizing most larger cruise missiles. However, the acquisition of interceptors, particularly Patriots, is crucial for defending against Russia's Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles.

Currently, Ukraine intercepts around 70% of ballistic missiles, but this percentage has been steadily declining over time. In recent months, Ukraine has been forced to rely on improvised systems and has not issued regular updates regarding their intercept capabilities.

While some nations possess a reasonable number of interceptors, such as Germany, Greece, Poland, and Spain, these countries are increasingly reluctant to part with them. To address this crisis, manufacturers have agreed to increase PAC-3 production from 600 units per year to approximately 2,000 units by the early 2030s. The Pentagon has also solicited ideas to further accelerate production.

However, the actual contracts for these increased outputs have yet to be signed. Allies' industrial capacities can offer some assistance, with Japan producing around 30 PAC-3 interceptors annually under license for its own use, and MBDA, a European firm, set to begin production of older PAC-2 models in Germany. Additionally, NATO's latest summit in July discussed allowing Ukraine to produce Patriots under license, but this idea has since been put on hold due to concerns over the loss of know-how and the emergence of cheaper Ukrainian alternatives.

Despite these developments, Ukraine will receive upgraded SAMP-T batteries, equipped with newer interceptors, starting from next year. However, these advancements will likely be slower and in smaller numbers compared to the widely-used Patriots. As Ukraine continues to innovate in the realm of drone warfare, it remains to be seen whether the creation of cost-effective, locally-developed missile defense systems will be sufficient to counter the ever-growing threat from advanced ballistic missiles.