When does party loyalty become complicity?

The concept of party loyalty versus complicity in the context of corruption has been a subject of debate. Hanipa Maidin, a former deputy minister of law, argues that attributing systemic corruption to an entire political organization due to the actions of a single member is an unfair generalization. He asserts that individual allegations of corruption should not be used as grounds to disrupt strategic alliances between political entities, particularly in the context of the existing political understanding between Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN).

According to traditional legal principles, criminal liability is based on individual responsibility, meaning a person must independently bear the legal consequences of their unlawful actions. However, criminal law also recognizes the doctrine of secondary liability, often referred to as aiding and abetting. This legal principle encompasses psychological encouragement, instigation, or implicit institutional approval.

Under this doctrine, secondary actors can be prosecuted and penalized to the same extent as the principal perpetrator, even if they did not directly participate in the criminal act.

Under Section 107 of the Penal Code, abetment is defined as inciting, conspiring, or intentionally aiding in the commission of a crime. An individual can be considered an abettor if they provoke the crime, engage in a criminal conspiracy to commit it, or provide deliberate assistance in its completion. Liability for abetment can still apply, regardless of whether the principal offense is ultimately carried out.

Moreover, under Section 109 of the Penal Code, if the offense occurs as a result of such instigation or assistance, the abettor faces the same penalty as the principal offender.

While assigning collective blame for individual misconduct might seem problematic at first glance, it becomes less justifiable when a politician or political party directly or indirectly supports the criminal enterprise. Direct institutional involvement is clear when the organizer gains material or financial benefit from the crime.

In the infamous 1MDB case, for example, evidence showed that illicitly acquired funds from the sovereign wealth fund were systematically distributed among party leadership at various administrative levels. In situations where a political institution benefits financially from internal corruption and refuses to take corrective action while vigorously defending the implicated individual, it cannot be absolved of public and moral condemnation.

This systemic complicity is further exacerbated when, following a formal judicial conviction for corruption or abuse of power, party leadership and members launch collective campaigns to absolve the convicted official. In such cases, the organization might be seen as more than just a passive observer, actively endorsing the criminal act through institutional validation.

The question of whether a political entity should remain immune from liability for offenses committed by its individual leaders depends on the structural and institutional context. When systemic corruption is deeply entrenched within the institutional framework of a political party, distinguishing between individual criminality and organizational misconduct becomes challenging.

In such scenarios, when corrupt practices are normalized within the party's operational structure, individual transgressions often reflect collective institutional behavior rather than isolated deviance.